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THE VIRTUES OF "COMMAND AND
CONTROL" REGULATION: BARRING
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ECOSYSTEMS
Sandra B. Zellmer*
The Clean Water Act asserts the ambitious goal of eliminating
water pollution and protecting the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of U.S. waters. Yet the EPA, in enforcing the Act, currently
exempts from regulation a significant source of pollution in U.S. wa-
ters: ballast-water discharges from commercial shipping vessels.
Ballast water from commercial vessels is a primary vector for the in-
troduction of exotic plant and animal species into U.S. waters. The
invasion of these species poses an increasing threat to native biodiver-
sity; the invaders prey directly on native fish and wildlife, compete for
food and habitat, and introduce disease and parasites into commer-
cial waterways. Given the severe economic and ecological conse-
quences associated with exotic species, the lack of regulatory man-
dates is a critical omission in U.S. environmental law.
Ongoing debates on environmental regulation focus on the ap-
propriate form for pollution restrictions. Specifically, the debates
center on whether the use of economic tools, such as subsidies or
taxation, or regulation under technology-based permit regimes is
more effective in reducing pollution levels. In this article, Professor
Zellmer suggests that regulation of ballast-water discharges under the
Clean Water Act (CWA) would significantly reduce exotic invasions
in U.S. aquatic ecosystems and is preferable to economic approaches.
The article argues that the current regulatory exemption for ballast-
water discharges is inconsistent with the plain language of the CWA.
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It outlines the advantages of a regulatory program and addresses the
practical implications of implementing the CWA permit system in the
context of ballast-water discharges.
"The success of technology-based standards in abating toxic water
pollution depends largely upon one's predisposition to enjoy the
donut or regret the hole."1
I. INTRODUCTION
The invasion and establishment of nonindigenous species of animals
and plants is one of the few environmental issues in the United States as
yet unaddressed through federal legal controls. The lack of regulatory
mandates suggests a glaring omission in U.S. environmental law. Given
the severe economic and ecological consequences associated with exotic-
species invasions, regulation is essential to the physical and biological in-
tegrity of U.S. land and waters. A primary source of exotic invasions in
U.S. waters is ballast-water discharges from commercial shipping vessels.
These discharges are largely unregulated!
Due to the lack of regulation, U.S. aquatic ecosystems have been
invaded heavily by exotic species introduced through ballast water.
Some of the most affected areas include San Francisco Bay, Chesapeake
Bay, New York's Finger Lakes, and the Great Lakes region. The Great
Lakes have been especially hard-hit by hostile and prolific invaders like
the zebra mussel. In September 1999, the International Joint Commis-
sion (IJC), comprised of Canadian and U.S. representatives, hosted a
workshop to consider preventative measures to control Great Lakes' in-
vasions, drawing upon the expertise of biologists, lawyers, and public of-
ficials. A policy-based proposal, Exotic Policy: An IJC White Paper on
Policies for the Prevention of the Invasion of the Great Lakes by Exotic
Organisms' (White Paper), served as the centerpiece for discussion at the
workshop.
The White Paper attempts to breathe new life into the perennial ar-
gument that economic initiatives, such as subsidies or taxation, are more
effective than "command-and-control" regulation in preventing pollu-
1. Oliver A. Houck, Clean Water Act and Related Programs, SB52 A.LI.-A.B.A. 241, 256
(1997).
2. Although the National Invasive Species Act (NISA) provides guidelines for ballast-water
exchange, the guidelines are not legally enforceable. See infra Part II. Regulations issued by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) exclude ballast-water discharges from the Clean Water
Act's (CWA) permit program. See infra Part III.
3. Eric Reeves, Exotic Policy: An IC White Paper on Policies for the Prevention of the Inva-
sion of the Great Lakes by Exotic Organisms (last modified July 15, 2000) <http://www.ijc.org/
milwaukee/wrkshps/exoticpolicy.html> [hereinafter Reeves, White Paper] (on file with the University
of Illinois Law Review). A revised version of the White Paper is published in Exotic Politics: An
Analysis of the Economics, Law, and Politics of Exotic Invasions of the Great Lakes, 2 TOL. J. GREAT
LAKES' L., SCI. & POL'Y 125 (2000) [hereinafter Reeves, Exotic Politics].
[Vol. 2000
No. 4] VIRTUES OF "COMMAND AND CONTROL" REGULATION 1235
tion. Specifically, the White Paper concludes that economic tools are
more likely to prevent the introduction of exotic species through ballast
water than technology-based permit regimes. 4 However, this article sug-
gests instead that regulation under the Clean Water Act (CWA) would
be highly effective in preventing invasions in aquatic ecosystems, at least
with respect to ships traversing U.S. waters.'
The plain language of the CWA prohibits the discharge of contami-
nated water from vessels unless a permit is obtained.6 Regulations issued
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), however, exclude
ballast-water discharges from the CWA's permit program This regula-
tory exclusion finds no support in the statute.
The CWA asserts the ambitious goals of eliminating water pollution
and protecting the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of U.S. wa-
ters.8 To accomplish these objectives, the discharge of any pollutant
from a point source is absolutely prohibited unless authorized by permit.'
Point sources are generally known as discrete anthropogenic convey-
ances, such as industrial pipes or conduits. 0 Permits for point source dis-
charges must incorporate effluent limitations reflecting the best technol-
ogy available." Violations are redressed through the CWA's aggressive
enforcement provisions, including citizen suits.'2 These provisions are
superior to control efforts based on economic measures alone, 3 and, if
effectuated by the EPA in the context of ballast-water discharges, would
result in marked improvement over the status quo. 4
This article will first provide background regarding the effects of
exotic species on aquatic ecosystems and the current legal framework
governing ballast-water discharges. It will then turn, in part III, to the
relevant sections of the CWA. Part IV compares the advantages of a
regulatory program for preventing the introduction of exotic species to
economic approaches. Finally, parts V and VI address the practical im-
4. See Reeves, White Paper, supra note 3, § 10.3.
5. As aquatic species do not respect political boundaries, introductions through ballast water in
Canadian and Mexican waters can have serious effects in the United States. However, this article is
limited to an assessment of U.S. domestic law, in particular, the Clean Water Act. See Clean Water
Act Amendment of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1387 (1994)). For a discussion of the international implications of pollution from shipping, see Barry
Hart Dubner, On the Interplay of International Law of the Sea and the Prevention of Maritime Pollu-
tion- How Far Can a State Proceed in Protecting Itself from Conflicting Norn in International Law,
11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 137 (1998). On the subject of controlling exotic species in the interna-
tional law context, see David J. Bederman, International Control of Marine "Pollution" by Exotic Spe-
cies, 18 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 677 (1991).
6. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
7. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a)(1) (1999).
8. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1994).
9. See id. § 1311(a).
10. See id. § 1362(14).
11. See id. § 1311(b)(2)(A).
12. See id. § 1365(a).
13. See discussion infra Part IV.
14. See id.
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plications of implementing the CWA permit system in the context of
ballast-water discharges and possibilities for interagency and intergov-
ernmental cooperation in enforcing discharge regulations.
II. EXOTIC SPECIES DISCHARGED WITH BALLAST WATER: EFFECTS
AND CURRENT CONTROLS
Exotic species have taken a heavy toll on U.S. waters. 5 Numerous
scientific and legal publications provide detailed assessments of the ad-
verse consequences of exotic invasions in the Great Lakes and other
aquatic ecosystems, particularly invasions from ballast discharges. 6 To
set the stage for a discussion of economic and regulatory control meth-
ods, this section of the article will outline some of the most serious ef-
fects.
Exotic species have made a significant contribution to overall envi-
ronmental degradation and the decline of indigenous species.17 Their in-
vasion "poses an increasing global threat to native biodiversity, ranked
second only to habitat loss."18 Some exotic invaders, like the rapacious
sea lamprey (Petromyzon marinus), depredate directly on native fish and
wildlife, 9 while others cause adverse effects by competing for food and
habitat and by introducing disease and parasites." In the San Francisco
Bay- an area that rivals the Great Lakes for "the dubious distinction of
being the most invaded estuary in North America"- exotic species "have
15. See infra notes 17-31 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., John J. Ewel et al., Deliberate Introductions of Species: Research Needs, 49 Bi-
OSCIENCE 619, 620 (1999); Brent Foster, Pollutants Without Half-lives: The Role of Federal Environ-
mental Laws in Controlling Ballast Water Discharges of Exotic Species, 30 ENVTL. L. 99 (2000); David
M. Whalin, The Control of Aquatic Nuisance Nonindigenous Species, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 65 (1998), avail-
able in WESTLAW, ENVTLAW database; David P. Eldridge, Comment, Leviathan Lurks: Might the
National Invasive Species Act of 1996 Actually Authorize Invasion by Proscribed Species?, 6 S.C.
ENVTL. L.J. 47 (1997); Glenn Zorpette, Mussel Mayhem Continued: Apparent Benefits of Zebra Mus-
sel Plague Are Anything But, 275 SCt. AMERICAN 2, 22-23 (1996); Reeves, White Paper, supra note 3;
see also Implementation of the National Invasive Species Act of 1996 (NISA), 64 Fed. Reg. 26,672,
26,673 (1999) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 151) (interim rule May 17, 1999) (stating that "[a]quatic
nuisance species invasions through ballast water are now recognized as a serious problem threatening
global biological diversity and human health"). For additional information, see National Sea Grant
College Program (visited Feb. 27, 2000) <http://www.sgnis.org>, a comprehensive on-line collection of
research publications and other materials about aquatic exotic species established by the Great Lakes
Sea Grant Network.
17. See Proposed Water Quality Guidance for the Great Lakes System, 58 Fed. Reg. 20,802,
20,807 (1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 123, 131, 132) (proposed Apr. 16, 1993).
18. Ewel et al., supra note 16, at 620; see also David S. Wilcove et al., Quantifying Threats to Im-
periled Species in the United States, 48 BIOScIENCE 607-15 (1998) (stating that exotics pose a serious
threat to native species listed as federally endangered or threatened).
19. See Great Lakes Fishery Commission, Sea Lamprey Control, (visited Dec. 20, 1999) <http://
www.glfc.org/lampcon.htm> (describing effects on native fishes such as lake trout, walleye, and white-
fish).
20. See Eric Reeves, Analysis of Laws & Policies Concerning Exotic Invasions of the Great
Lakes: A Report to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, at 8-9 (Mar. 15, 1999), avail-
able at <http://www.deq.state.mi.us/ogl/exotic2.pdf> [hereinafter Reeves, Analysis of Laws & Policies];
Zorpette, supra note 16, at 22-23.
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overwhelmed native species and dramatically altered the bay's life cy-
cle."21
Exotic species also cause a variety of economic harms, due to de-
clining fisheries as well as structural and ecological damage. Estimates of
the annual costs attributable to exotic species nationwide, both terrestrial
and aquatic, range as high as $123 billion.22 Total losses caused by only
fifteen selected aquatic invaders, including the zebra mussel (Dreissena
polymorpha) and the purple loosestrife plant (Lythrum salicaria), have
been estimated at over $134 billion.23 The highly fecund zebra mussel is
one of the most costly to control; national estimates range between $3-$5
billion a year, in large part due to the expenses incurred by power plants
to clear and maintain clogged intake pipes. 24 The sea lamprey also causes
significant losses to native fisheries, and $10 million is spent in the Great
Lakes for annual control efforts and native-fish stocking costs. 25
Ballast water is one of the primary vectors for the introduction of
exotic species into U.S. waters subject to commercial shipping. 6 Vessels
generally pump ballast water into tanks to replace the weight of off-
21. Mary Curtius, San Francisco Bay: Cleaner but Still a Ways to Go, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1998,
at Al; see San Francisco Bay Project, Water Resources Division, The History and Effects of Exotic
Species in San Francisco Bay (visited July 15, 2000) <http://sfbay.wr.usgs.gov/access/exotic-species/
exoticsp.pdf>; Water Quality Standards for Surface Waters of the Sacramento River, San Joaquin
River, and San Francisco Bay and Delta of the State of California, 60 Fed. Reg. 4664, 4665 n.3 (1995)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131) (stating that, due to the introduction of exotic species, as well as
drought conditions and increased water diversions, the Bay/Delta has experienced a "low level of bio-
logical diversity"). The Chesapeake Bay is another water body that receives vast quantities of ballast
water from almost fifty different foreign ports, but for reasons as yet unknown, the Chesapeake has
not experienced infestations of exotic species to the same extent as other U.S. waterways subject to
commercial vessel traffic. See Chesapeake Bay Commission, The Introduction of Nonindigenous Spe-
cies to the Chesapeake Bay Via Ballast Water (visited Feb. 27, 2000) <http://nas.nfrcg.gov./ballast.htm>.
22. See Dan Fagin, Foreign Species of Plants, Animals and Insects Endanger the Future of Our
Homegrown Natural World, NEWSDAY, Apr. 11, 1999, at A12.
23. See Sharonne O'Shea & Allegra Cangelosi, Trojan Horses in Our Harbors: Biological Con-
tamination from Ballast Water Discharge, 27 U. TOL. L. REv. 381, 382-85 (1996); U.S. CONGRESS,
OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, HARMFUL NON-INDIGENOUS SPECIES IN THE UNITED STATES 6
(OTA-F-565, Sept. 1993) [hereinafter OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT].
24. See 16 U.S.C. § 4701(a)(4) (1994). The zebra mussel attaches to water pipes, thereby re-
stricting water flow and increasing sedimentation and corrosion, resulting in significant maintenance,
plant-design, and shut-down expenses. See Zorpette, supra note 16, at 22-23; OFFICE OF TECH.
ASSESSMENT, supra note 23, at 67. Each adult mussel is capable of filtering a liter of water per day; as
a result, the zebra mussel has increased Lake Erie's water clarity but at the same time has dramatically
reduced populations of phytoplankton, the foundation of the lake's food web. See Zebra Mussels and
Other Nonindigenous Species (visited Feb. 27, 2000) <http://www.seagrant.wisc.edu/GreatLakes/
Glnetworkexotics.html>.
25. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 23, at 57. The Great Lakes Fishery Commis-
sion estimates that the Eurasian ruffe, which has become one of the most abundant fish in Lake Supe-
rior's harbors, could cause annual losses to native fisheries exceeding $90 million by competing with
native fisheries and eating critical forage. See Eldridge, supra note 16, at 48 n.6; 142 CONG. REC.
H10,925 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1996) (statement of Rep. Oberstar).
26. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STEMMING THE TIDE: CONTROLLING INTRODUCTIONS
OF NONINDIGENOUS SPECIES BY SHIPS' BALLAST WATER 11 (National Academy Press 1996) [herein-
after STEMMING THE TIDE]; Foster, supra note 16, at 140; Whalin, supra note 16, at *16; Curtius, supra
note 21, at Al (noting that ballast water has been responsible for introducing exotic species, particu-
larly shellfish, to the Bay since the 1800s).
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loaded cargo or expended fuel, thereby improving vessel stability in
transport. 27 The zebra mussel is perhaps the most well publicized of the
invaders attributed to ballast-water discharges. Others include the Eura-
sian ruffe (Gymnocephalus cemuus),28 round goby (Neogobius melanos-
tomus),29 the spiny water flea (Bythotrephes cederstroemi) and its more
recently introduced relative, the fishhook water flea (Cercopagis pen-
goi)," and even human bacterial pathogens like cholera."
The discharge of ballast from commercial ships was virtually un-
regulated until the early 1990s, when regulations were issued pursuant to
the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of
1990 (NANPCA), as amended in 1996 by the National Invasive Species
Act (NISA).32 Under NISA, vessels generally are required to exchange
their ballast at sea before entering the Great Lakes.33 As for other U.S.
waters, NISA merely provides voluntary guidelines for ballast-water ex-
change. 4 The guidelines are designed to "ensure to the maximum extent
27. See STEMMING THE TIDE, supra note 26, at 22.
28. See Eldridge, supra note 16, at 47; Bederman, supra note 5, at 682.
29. See Invasive Species: Sighting of Round Goby Worries Canadians, GREENWIRE, Aug. 2,
1999, at 18. Once introduced into U.S. waters, the goby has been spread, in part, by its use as baitfish.
Id. The introduction of the round goby may have some positive effects, as it is one of the few species
that feeds on zebra mussels. See Don Zaidle, Catch-22, 204 OUTDOOR LIE, Dec. 1, 1999, at 20. Al-
though the goby may control zebra-mussel populations, it may also absorb PCBs and other toxins that
mussels filtered out of the water, passing those substances along to the bass and other native fish that
feed on it. See Will Elliott, Biologists Wary as Gobies Work Their Way into W. NY Waters, BUFF.
NEWS, Nov. 14, 1999, at B14; Janet Raloff, Invading Gobies Conquer Great Lakes, ScI. NEWS, July 31,
1999, at 68.
30. See O'Shea & Cangelosi, supra note 23, at 383. The fishhook water flea was discovered in
1998 in Lake Ontario; it has since been documented in Lake Michigan and New York's Finger Lakes.
See J. Raloff, New Flea Imperils Fish, Fouls Gear, SC. NEWS, Nov. 13, 1999, at 308. Fifty to eighty
fleas, which can fit within one square inch of space, hook together and form gelatinous masses, fouling
fishing gear and devouring the plankton that larval fish need to survive. See id.
31. See International Maritime Organization (IMO) Ballast Water Control Guidelines, 56 Fed.
Reg. 64,831, 64,831 (1991); O'Shea & Cangelosi, supra note 23, at 383-84 & nn.20-22 (1996) (citing,
inter alia, Edward L. Mills et al., Exotic Species in the Great Lakes: A History of Biotic Crises and
Anthropogenic Introductions, 19 J. GREAT LAKES RES. 1, 2-4 (1993)). But see Implementation of the
National Invasive Species Act of 1996 (NISA), 64 Fed. Reg. 26,672, 26,674 (1999) (to be codified at 33
C.F.R. pt. 151) (interim rule May 17, 1999) (stating that, although comments submitted on the Coast
Guard's interim guidelines for ballast-water management noted that cholera was detected in ballast
water, there was no "conclusive evidence that linked the strain of cholera detected to the contami-
nated shellfish in Mobile Bay"). Other species sometimes attributed to ballast water include plants
like the purple loosestrife and Eurasian water milfoil; however, these species were more likely intro-
duced through aquariums, nurseries, or other vectors. See id. at 26,674; Charles K. Dayton, A Frontal
Attack on a New Menace to Minnesota Lakes, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIB., July 22, 1989, at
11A.
32. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4701-4751 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); see O'Shea & Cangelosi, supra note 23, at
383.
33. See 16 U.S.C. § 4711. Vessels entering the Great Lakes are generally inspected at Montreal,
Quebec, before they may enter the St. Lawrence Seaway and Great Lakes ports.
34. See id. § 4711(c); see also 33 C.F.R. § 151.2035(a) (1999) (requesting that vessels with ballast
tanks take "voluntary precautions to minimize the uptake and the release of harmful aquatic organ-
isms, pathogens, and sediments," including ballast water exchange and other management measures);
Implementation of the National Invasive Species Act of 1996 (NISA), 64 Fed. Reg. at 26,672 (issuing
interim guidelines for vessels operating in U.S. waters other than the Great Lakes).
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practicable that aquatic nuisance species are not discharged into waters
of the United States from vessels," but they are not legally enforceable.35
Even in the Great Lakes, NISA does not specify federal require-
ments for the "purity" of ballast water released. Instead, Coast Guard
regulations employ a salinity standard recommending that ballast be at
least 30 parts per thousand (ppt) salt.36 Although there is no evidence
that 30 ppt salinity acts as an effective biocide, it presumably indicates
that an ocean exchange of approximately eighty-five percent of water by
volume occurred, thus flushing out species present in ballast water taken
from foreign ports.37 However, even if eighty-five percent were consid-
ered a reasonably adequate exchange, foreign flag vessels could enter
U.S. ports with highly saline ballast water whether or not they have ac-
complished an ocean exchange. Ships that fill their ballast tanks in
highly saline ports, such as those on the Mediterranean Sea, may have a
salinity factor equal or higher than 35.3 ppt, the average salinity of the
Atlantic Ocean, before they even set sail.38 In addition, evaporative
losses during a transoceanic voyage tend to increase salinity in the tank.39
Given these variables, the salinity test provides no guarantee that an
ocean exchange occurred.
There are broad-sweeping exemptions in NISA that further under-
mine the exchange provisions. First, exchange can be avoided on the
grounds of ship safety, a determination left almost entirely to the cap-
tain's discretion.' Safety reasons may include "vessel architectural de-
sign" or "other extraordinary conditions."41 Accordingly, a captain who
sails a poorly designed ship, or, arguably, a ship with an inexperienced
crew or one sailing under a tight schedule can avoid ballast exchange.
Ships that fail to accomplish an exchange outside the exclusive economic
zone must employ another method of ballast-water management before
entering the Great Lakes,42 or request the Coast Guard's permission to
exchange ballast water in an alternative designated area.43 The exemp-
tion sweeps even more broadly for ships traversing U.S. waters other
than the Great Lakes; they may avoid exchange on safety grounds, and
then proceed to discharge water "in any harbor."'"
35. 16 U.S.C. § 4711(c)(2)(A).
36. See 33 C.F.R. § 151.1510(a)(1) (1999).
37. See Reeves, Analysis of Laws & Policies, supra note 20, at 57.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See 16 U.S.C. § 4711(k)(1). Safety is, of course, a valid consideration, given that the pumping
of ballast tanks can create hull stress due to the change in buoyancy in one or another section of the
vessel during the exchange process. But "hull stress is a chronic problem, particularly with older bulk
carriers -related to age, maintenance, cargo loading, and sea conditions- regardless of whether or
not those vessels are required to conduct ballast exchanges." Reeves, Analysis of Laws & Policies,
supra note 20, at 52.
41. 16 U.S.C. § 4711(k)(1).
42. See 33 C.F.R. § 151.1510(a) (1999).
43. See 16 U.S.C. § 4711(k)(2)(B); 33 C.F.R. § 151.1514.
44. 16 U.S.C. § 4711(k)(2)(A)-(B).
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Perhaps NISA's greatest shortcoming is its failure to require treat-
ment of residual sediments and slop in the tanks of ships fully laden with
cargo, known as "no ballast on board," or NOBOB, vessels.45 While a
ship is fully loaded with cargo, the residue in a ship's ballast-water tanks
is unpumpable.46 Although residual sediments and slop can support
aquatic life forms, which subsequently will be mixed with ballast water
pumped into the tanks, NISA imposes no requirements on NOBOBs.
The Coast Guard has recognized that NISA is flawed and that man-
datory standards could improve the quality of ballast water entering U.S.
waterways. In 1998, the Coast Guard proposed a shift from the salinity
test to performance standards, much like those required under pollution
control statutes like the CWA.47 Under the proposed regulations, a
ninety percent exchange requirement would replace the 30 ppt salinity
test; salinity, among other things, would merely provide evidence that
exchange occurred.' However, these changes were not adopted when
the interim rule issued in May 1999 "[b]ecause of strong opposition by
the shipping industry.
49
Recently proposed amendments to NISA would require regulations
for the treatment of ballast and NOBOB sediments entering the Great
Lakes "to the maximum extent practicable ... through the most effective
and efficient techniques available, including sterilization. 50 The bill, en-
titled The Great Lakes Ecology Protection Act of 2000, was introduced
in April 2000, and is currently pending before the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure.51 Although this could be a positive
step toward technology-based regulation, as discussed below, the CWA
addresses the problem in a more expedient and effective manner, with-
out requiring legislative amendment.
45. See Reeves, Analysis of Laws & Policies, supra note 20, at 54-55.
46. See id. at 54; Implementation of the National Invasive Species Act of 1996 (NISA), 64 Fed.
Reg. 26,672, 26,675 (1999) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 151) (interim rule May 17,1999).
47. See Implementation of the National Invasive Species Act of 1996 (NISA), 63 Fed. Reg.
17,782, 17,784-85 (1998) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 151) (proposed April 10, 1998).
48. See Implementation of the National Invasive Species Act of 1996 (NISA), 63 Fed. Reg. at
17,785, 17,789. The Coast Guard concluded that "90 percent is a reasonable standard to set, which is
of minimal cost to the industry in that it does not require any changes to current ship designs, subject
to the clearly stated exemption for vessels that cannot safely conduct an exchange." Id. at 17,785.
49. Reeves, White Paper, supra note 3, § 7; see Implementation of the National Invasive Species
Act of 1996 (NISA), 64 Fed. Reg. at 26,672. Yet the Coast Guard's stated goal remains "for owners
and operators to exchange 100 percent of the original water in the ballast tank" if possible given "op-
erating systems and physical limitations of the vessel." Id. at 26,677.
50. Great Lakes Ecology Protection Act of 2000, H.R. 4191, 106th Cong. (1999).
51. See Thomas Bill Summary & Status (visited August 28, 2000) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. The
bill has been referred to the Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment and the Subcom-
mittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation. See id. (providing status of H.R. 4191, 106th
Cong. (1999)).
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III. THE CWA's APPLICATION TO BALLAST-WATER DISCHARGES
FROM VESSELS
The CWA embraces the simple yet profound goal of eliminating the
discharge of water pollutants.52 To accomplish this ambitious goal, sec-
tion 301 prohibits the "discharge of any pollutant by any person" unless a
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit is ob-
tained.13 This key phrase, "discharge of a pollutant," is defined, in rele-
vant part, as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any
point source."54  Navigable waters include all surface waters of the
United States, including lakes, rivers and streams, wetlands, and the ter-
ritorial seas."
Pollutants are added to U.S. waters from a point source when bal-
last water containing exotic species is discharged from vessels. Yet the
EPA, by regulation, has excluded ballast-water discharges from the
NPDES program:
The following discharges do not require NPDES permits: (a)
Any discharge of sewage from vessels, effluent from properly func-
tioning marine engines, laundry, shower, and galley sink wastes, or
any other discharge incidental to the normal operation of a vessel. 6
The Pacific Environmental Advocacy Center and other groups peti-
tioned the EPA for the repeal of its regulation in January 1999."7 In re-
sponse, the EPA acknowledged that ballast water could be covered by
the CWA's prohibition on point source discharges, and stated that it
would prepare a report to "explore options" for regulating ballast water
by September 1, 1999.58 However, no official report or proposed rule has
been issued to date. Once the EPA does make a final determination, it
could be subject to a citizen suit under the CWA.59
A. Exotic Species Are Pollutants
The language of the statute, as well as its objectives and legislative
history, support the inclusion of exotic "pollutants" in the regulatory
52. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1994).
53. Id. § 1311(a), 1342.
54. Id. § 1362(12).
55. See id. § 1362(7)-(8). See generally 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1999) (defining "waters of the United
States"); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (upholding an expan-
sive regulatory definition of navigable waters as including certain wetlands).
56. 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a) (1999) (emphasis added).
57. See Letter from Craig N. Johnston, counsel for Pacific Environmental Advocacy Center
(PEAC), et al., to Carol Browner (Jan. 13, 1999) (on file with author).
58. Letter from Charles Fox, Asst. Administrator, EPA, to Craig N. Johnston, PEAC (Apr. 6,
1999) (on file with author).
59. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1994) ("[any citizen may commence a civil action ... against the
Administrator [of the EPA] where there is alleged a failure ... to perform any act or duty under this
chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator."); see also infra Part IV.D. (discussing citi-
zen suits).
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program.' ° The term pollutant, as used in the CWA, means heat and a
variety of substances, such as garbage, solid waste, sewage, chemical
wastes, and, most importantly here, biological materials.61 Although the
definition of pollutant in the CWA is not so broadly phrased as to be
considered all-inclusive, 62 courts have construed it to encompass sub-
stances not specifically enumerated but subsumed under the listed, more
general terms.63  Thus, fish and other organisms-alive, in various life
stages, or dead- are included under the term "biological materials," and
are therefore pollutants under the CWA.'
However, courts have deferred to the EPA's determination that
NPDES permits are not required when fish and fish parts are moved
through a water body via dams because there is no "addition" of pollut-
ants from dams: the fish do not come from the "outside world" but in-
stead originate within the same ecosystem.' Similarly, the transfer of
cold water from an impounded reservoir through a dam to the receiving
stream or river is not considered an "addition" of a pollutant.' By con-
trast, seafood-processing plants that remove and process fish and then
discharge the fish wastes into receiving waters of the United States are
adding pollutants. 67
The EPA has recognized that exotic species are pollutants under
the CWA section 301 and in a variety of other contexts. For example,
pathogens in sewage effluent are undoubtedly biological pollutants that
60. See Whalin, supra note 16, at *10-12, 26-27 (reviewing legislative history of the CWA and
determining that the definition of pollutants should include living aquatic invasive species); Reeves,
White Paper, supra note 3, § 1 (agreeing that exotic species are pollutants, as a matter of law, econom-
ics, and common sense); see also Eldridge, supra note 16, at 49.
61. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1994).
62. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 171-72 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding in
dicta that cold, unlike heat, is a water condition; because cold is not specifically listed, while heat is a
pollutant, cold is not a pollutant).
63. See United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 112-13 (6th Cir. 1977) (affirming the district
court's decision that petroleum products are included under the broad term "chemical waste," even
though Congress did not list oil and oil products by name within the definition of pollutant); see also
Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n v. City of New York, 751 F. Supp. 1088, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(holding that chlorine, when discharged into navigable waters, is regarded as a pollutant, though in-
tended for a beneficial use), affd, 940 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1991).
64. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1988); see
also United States v. Dubois, 102 F.3d 1273, 1296-97 & n.29 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding that movement of
organisms from river water to a pond is an addition of pollutants: although defendant's snowmaking
did not itself contribute new pollutants, it was undisputed that the river contained at least some pollut-
ants not found in pond, including the parasitic giardia lambia); Association of Pacific Fisheries v. EPA,
615 F.2d 794,807 n.7 & 815 (9th Cir. 1980) (concluding that fish wastes discharged from seafood proc-
essors are pollutants).
65. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d at 584-86.
66. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 161.
67. See Association of Pacific Fisheries, 615 F.2d at 801; 40 C.F.R. pt. 408 (1999). Along the
same lines, courts have found the movement of dredged-up sediments and debris, although indigenous
materials at their place of origin, adds pollutants when introduced to another area. See United States
v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc., 772 F.2d 1501, 1506 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1034
(1985), reh'g on other grounds, 863 F.2d 802 (1989); United States v. Banks, 873 F. Supp. 650, 657 (S.D.
Fla. 1995).
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may not be discharged into navigable waters without a permit.' In addi-
tion, in proposing regulations for the establishment of Total Maximum
Daily Loads (TMDLs) pursuant to the CWA section 303,69 the EPA ex-
plicitly stated that "all microbial contaminants that may be discharged to
waters of the U.S. (e.g., bacteria, viruses, and other organisms) fall under
the term 'biological materials."'7 The EPA also implicitly acknowledged
that invasive species contribute to water-quality impairment within the
meaning of the CWA section 303 by approving California's list of 472
impaired waters, including those listed as impaired because of the pres-
ence of invasive species.7' The Coast Guard seems to be in agreement on
this point, as it has also determined that exotic species discharged with
ballast water should be considered pollutants.
B. Vessels Are Point Sources
Vessels that discharge ballast water into waters of the United States
are expressly included in the CWA's definition of a "point source." The
term is defined broadly in section 502(14) as "any discernible, confined
and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe.... or ves-
sel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be dis-
charged. '73 The definitional section excludes only "agricultural stormwa-
ter discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture." 74
Although an agency's construction of a statute under its administra-
tion is generally given deference, an interpretation that flies in the face of
68. See United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, [1985] 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,621 (D. Mass. 1985); Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 986 F. Supp.
1406, 1422 (N.D. Ga. 1997); see also United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 266, 269-70 (E.D.
Pa. 1978) (holding that bacteria in compost runoff is a biological material and therefore a pollutant),
affd, 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979).
69. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1994). Section 303(d) requires the identification
of impaired waters and establishment of TMDLs. See discussion infra Part IV.C (discussing TMDL
program).
70. Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 64 Fed.
Reg. 46,012, 46,017 (1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 130) (proposed Aug. 23, 1999).
71. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1994); Clean Water Act Section 303(d): Availability of List Submis-
sions and Proposed Decisions, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,556, 59,556-57 (1998); Foster, supra note 16, at 120; see
also L. Blaney & T. Kemp, WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, 15 CAL. REG. L. REP. 149, 150
(1995) (noting that an objective of California's plan is to reduce the impacts of introduced species on
native species in the San Francisco Bay/Delta estuary); Threatened Status for Two ESUs of Steelhead
in Washington, Oregon, and California, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,347, 13,356-57 (1998) (to be codified at 47
C.F.R. pt. 73) (describing the Bay/Delta accord and efforts to develop a long-term solution to water-
quality problems).
72. See Implementation of the National Invasive Species Act of 1996 (NISA), 64 Fed. Reg.
26,672, 26,675 (1998) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 151) (interim rule May 17, 1999) (stating that
"anything that makes an ecosystem less suitable for an activity, or unfit for or harmful to living things
is a pollutant," and concluding that nonindigenous organisms introduced through shipping activities
should be considered pollutants); cf. Bederman, supra note 5, at 689 (concluding that exotic species
should be treated as marine pollutants under various international agreements).
73. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994) (emphasis added).
74. Id. A limited exemption for storm water runoff from mining activities is found elsewhere in
the CWA. See id. § 1342(0(2).
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explicit statutory mandates, as does the EPA's regulatory exclusion of
ballast water, must be set aside.75 The EPA has met with unmitigated
failure in the CWA context when it has attempted to carve out certain
categories of point sources from the NPDES permit program. In NRDC
v. Costle, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit invali-
dated the EPA's regulatory exclusion for a variety of discharges, includ-
ing agricultural irrigation return flows - discharges that undoubtedly
emanate from discernible conveyances -as inconsistent with the plain
language of section 502(14), which at that time did not explicitly address
return flows. 6 The court rejected the EPA's defense that requiring per-
mits from agricultural activities would be difficult and expensive, stating
that "technological or administrative infeasibility of [uniform national ef-
fluent] limitations may result in adjustments in the permit programs...
but it does not authorize the Administrator to exclude the relevant point
source from the NPDES program."7 In other words, if the discharger is
a point source, only Congress can exclude it from the general prohibition
of section 301; the EPA is not free to rewrite the statute.
Not only is the ballast-water regulation inconsistent with the plain
language of the CWA's "point source" definition, it undermines the
CWA's straightforward and ambitious objectives. 8 The CWA is in-
tended "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological in-
tegrity of waters of the [United States]" by eliminating water pollution, 9
and to ensure that water quality supports fisheries and other designated
uses.' There can be no dispute that invasive species, no less than other
pollutants, have had tremendous effects on the quality and native biodi-
versity of U.S. waters.
75. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (holding that courts re-
viewing statutory interpretations by agencies should first determine whether the statute is ambiguous;
if not, the court may not defer to the agency, but must give effect to the plain meaning of the statute);
see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 489 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding Alaska's ap-
plication of the NPDES permit system to oil-tainted ballast water discharged from vessels, and noting
that the CWA provided only limited exemptions to the otherwise comprehensive NPDES program).
76. See NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377-79 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Congress subsequently
amended section 502(14) to explicitly exclude irrigation return flows. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994).
77. Costle, 568 F.2d at 1379.
78. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d at 493 (finding that CWA's objectives sup-
port Alaska's application of the NPDES program to ballast water).
79. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994) (emphasis added). A parallel provision is found in the Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement between the United States and Canada, which states that its purpose
is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of waters of the Great Lakes
Basin Ecosystem." Agreement Between the United States of America and Canada on Great Lakes
Water Quality 1978, Nov. 24, 1978, as amended by the Protocol of 1987, U.S.-Can., art. II, 30 U.S.T.
1383, 1387. Although the Agreement imposes no specific requirements with respect to exotic species,
Annex 6, dealing with pollution from shipping sources, calls for studies to determine if exotics in bal-
last-water discharges constitute a threat to the Great Lakes ecosystem. See id. at 1429 (annex 6).
However, like the CWA, the focus of the Agreement to date has been the control of chemical con-
taminants, particularly toxic pollutants.
80. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1994).
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Moreover, neither the legislative nor the regulatory history supports
the exclusion of ballast-water discharges.81 Although the CWA's legisla-
tive history does not specifically address ballast water, it specifies that all
discharges to waters of the United States, the contiguous zone and the
ocean, "were to be regulated by EPA under one Act or the other. 8 2 The
Committee on Public Works and Commerce intended "complete and in-
tegrated regulation of the disposal of pollutants into all waters and over
all sources of pollutants subject to its jurisdiction."83
The regulatory history of 40 C.F.R. § 122.3 indicates that the EPA
did not intend to exclude ballast-water discharges from commercial ships
when the regulation was first issued in 1973. The provision as originally
proposed in the federal register excluded only "discharges from properly
functioning marine engines. ' The final regulation was extended to
"discharges incidental to the normal operation of a vessel," but not trash
discarded overboard and discharges from vessels acting in a capacity
other than transportation, "such as when a vessel is being used as a stor-
age facility or a cannery."85 The EPA's explanation reflects that the ex-
clusion for incidental discharges was meant to apply to recreational
boats, not commercial vessels: "This type of discharge generally causes
little pollution and the exclusion of vessel wastes from the permit re-
quirements will reduce administrative costs drastically."86
81. See infra notes 82-108 and accompanying text.
82. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Revision of Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg.
32,853, 32,859 (1979) (citing Senate Committee on Public Works, Federal Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1971, S. REP. No. 92-414, at 74 (1971), reprinted in 2 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL Acr AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1492
(Comm. Print compiled for the Senate Comm. on Pub. Works 1973), and referencing the CWA and
the Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1431 (1994)). The Ocean Dumping
Act complements the CWA with regard to discharges outside of the CWA's jurisdiction, as it prohibits
vessels registered in the United States or flying a U.S. flag from transporting "any material for the
purpose of dumping it into ocean waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(2) (1994). It also prohibits any person
from dumping "any material transported from a location outside the United States" into U.S. territo-
rial seas, or the U.S. contiguous zone if it may affect U.S. territorial seas or territory, unless a permit is
obtained. Id. § 1411(b). For discussion of the CWA's jurisdictional limitations, see infra note 104 and
accompanying text (defining "contiguous zone" and "territorial seas").
83. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Revision of Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. at
32,859 (citing Senate Committee on Public Works, Federal Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1971, S. REP. No. 92-414, at 74 (1971), reprinted in 2 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1492 (Comm. Print
compiled for the Senate Comm. on Pub. Works 1973) (emphasis added)).
84. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Revision of Regulations, 38 Fed. Reg.
1362, 1363-64 (1973) (proposed Jan. 11, 1973); see Daniel E. O'Toole, Regulation of Navy Ship Dis-
charges under the Clean Water Act: Have too Many Chefs Spoiled the Broth?, 19 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 12-13 (1994) (discussing history of EPA's ballast-water exemption).
85. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 38 Fed. Reg. 13,527, 13,530 (1973) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. § 125.4(c)); see also National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Revision of
Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. at 32,859 (stating that, although the CWA does not define "'vessels or other
floating craft,' it appears that those terms refer to transportation vessels").
86. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 38 Fed. Reg. at 13,528. The legislative
history of the CWA seems to support a limited exclusion for recreational vehicles. Congress appar-
ently believed that permitting for millions of recreational boats would be an "unreasonable expendi-
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At least two other provisions of the CWA provide additional sup-
port for treating ballast discharges as point sources subject to the
NPDES program. First, statutory amendments enacted in 1996 exclude
incidental discharges from military vessels from the definition of pollut-
ant.87 At that time, Congress expressly noted that "[v]essels are point
sources of pollution" under the CWA.88 Given the operational problems
experienced by the Navy when various coastal states attempted to im-
pose inconsistent regulatory requirements or inspection programs on na-
val vessels,89 Congress believed that an alternative program was desirable
for the military. Thus, instead of obtaining NPDES permits to discharge
their ballast water, military vessels must comply with standards of per-
formance to be specified by regulation under another new provision, sec-
tion 312(n), ° which requires on-board, marine-pollution-control devices
if such devices are reasonable and practicable."
This exclusion provides at least some evidence that Congress in-
tended for incidental discharges, such as ballast water, from nonmilitary
vessels to be included in the NPDES program. Generally, an explicit ex-
clusion of one activity negates an implied exclusion of another type of ac-
tivity.'
However, courts could view the enactment of a statutory exclusion
for military vessels differently. The fact that Congress had notice that
the EPA was, by regulation, excluding all ballast discharges from
NPDES coverage, and had amended the relevant provisions of the CWA
with respect to military discharges only, could indicate congressional ap-
proval of the EPA's regulation.93 Because "the views of a subsequent
ture of administrative effort" as well as an "unreasonable burden on the individual boat owners."
O'Toole, supra note 84, at 12-13 (citing 118 CONG. REc. 16,875-76 (1972)).
87. See Uniform National Discharge Standards for Armed Forces Vessels Act § 325(c)(3), 33
U.S.C. § 1362(6) (Supp. IV 1998).
88. S. REP. No. 104-113, at 1 (1995).
89. See O'Toole, supra note 84, at 12-13 (citing S. REP. No. 104-113, at 1, 7).
90. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1322(n) (Supp. IV 1998).
91. See id. § 1322(n)(1), (2); 40 C.F.R. pt. 1700 (1999); see also discussion infra Part VI.
92. See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 618 (1980); League to Save Lake Tahoe, Inc.
v. Trounday, 598 F.2d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir. 1979); see also City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense
Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338 (1994) (In refusing to imply an exemption for incinerator ash from the haz-
ardous-waste provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Court noted
that Congress had provided a complete exemption in a separate section of RCRA by utilizing a com-
prehensive list of relevant activities, and therefore "knew how to draft a waste stream exemption in
RCRA when it wanted to"); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d at 488-90 (noting that the
CWA's explicit exclusion for certain types of discharges supported inclusion of ballast water in the
NPDES program).
93. See Geldermann, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 836 F.2d 310, 316 (7th Cir.
1987) (holding "the congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency's interpretation is persuasive
evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress" and quoting NLRB v. Bell Aero-
space Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-75 (1974)). Although it is not always realistic to infer approval of a judi-
cial or administrative interpretation from congressional silence, see Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106,
119-21 (1940); Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 140-41 (1941), once an agency's statu-
tory construction has been "fully brought to the attention of the public and the Congress," and Con-
gress has not sought to alter it although it has amended the statute in other respects, then a court may
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Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier
one," 94 postenactment developments like the exclusion for military ves-
sels cannot be given the weight of contemporaneous legislative reports or
statements.95 Even so, in determining the reasonableness of an agency's
interpretation of a facially ambiguous statute, courts will not ignore
authoritative congressional expressions, post hoc though they may be.96
If a court found the CWA ambiguous on this point, a longstanding
administrative interpretation like C.F.R. § 122.3 might be upheld. How-
ever, a reviewing court would be on firm legal ground if it found the
definitional provisions of CWA section 502, along with the general pro-
hibition of section 301, 9" clear and unambiguous. If so, the postenact-
ment legislative history would merit little, if any, weight. 98 If the statute
is plain on its face, courts need not resort to legislative history for con-
firmation, but must give the language of the statute "its natural mean-
ing."99 Although the EPA does have some power to define technical
terms like "point source" and "pollutant,""1 broad-sweeping categorical
exemptions like the one for ballast discharges from commercial vessels
should be rejected as inconsistent with the plain language of the CWA 1
The second provision that supports the inclusion of ballast-water
discharges in the NPDES program is found in the CWA's definition of a
"discharge of a pollutant." As discussed above, °z this section expressly
includes discharges to navigable waters "from any point source"; it also
presume that the agency has correctly discerned the legislature's intent. See Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469,487-89 (1940).
94. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117-19 (1980) (citing
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348-49 (1963) and United States v. Price, 361
U.S. 304,313 (1960)).
95. See Redlark v. C.I.R., 141 F.3d 936, 941 (9th Cir. 1998).
96. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 (1982); Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago, 441 U.S. 677, 687 n.7 (1979); Estate of Wallace v. Commissioner, 965 F.2d 1038, 1050-51 n.15
(11th Cir. 1992); McDonald v. Commissioner, 764 F.2d 322, 336 n.25 (5th Cir. 1985). Subsequent leg-
islative action, such as the amendment of a related statute or provision, is accorded more weight than
subsequent statements. See Bell, 456 U.S. at 534-35; Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 300-01 (1981).
97. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(6), (14) (1994).
98. See West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991) (Where a statute
"contains a phrase that is unambiguous-that has a clearly accepted meaning in both legislative and
judicial practice-we do not permit it to be expanded or contracted by the statements of individual
legislators or committees during the course of the enactment process."); see also United States v. Ron
Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) ("[Wjhere, as here, the statute's language is plain, 'the sole
function of the court is to enforce it according to its terms.'"); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S.
at 842-43 ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").
99. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 386 n.2 (1992); see Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. NRDC, 467 U.S. at 842-83; Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 591-92 (1980). The statute
itself, not committee reports or other legislative statements, provides the "authoritative expression" of
the law. City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 337-38 (1994) (holding that
ash generated by resource recovery facility's incineration of municipal solid waste was subject to Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulatory scheme governing hazardous waste pur-
suant to plain language of section 3001(i), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i)).
100. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
101. See NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
102. See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.
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includes discharges to the contiguous zone or the ocean "from any point
source other than a vessel or floating craft."' 3 The term "navigable wa-
ters" includes the territorial seas, which extends three miles seaward
from the ordinary low-water mark, but not the contiguous zone, which is
the area beyond the territorial seas."t4 Accordingly, by negative implica-
tion, vessels that discharge ballast to inland waters and territorial seas are
in fact discharging pollutants from point sources. 5
Other statutes and executive materials validate this interpretation of
the CWA. NISA, enacted after the CWA, states that it does "not affect
or supercede any requirements or prohibitions pertaining to the dis-
charge of ballast" under the CWA.' ° This generally applicable, broadly
worded savings clause indicates that the CWA should apply to ballast-
water discharges in United States waters.107
Finally, as a matter of federal policy, Executive Order 13,112 directs
the EPA and other agencies to "use relevant programs and authorities
to... prevent the introduction of invasive species.""0 8 Thus, the EPA not
only has the authority and even the mandate to regulate ballast under the
CWA, but also should do so as a matter of federal prerogative. The EPA
has experience and technical expertise in controlling pollution from a va-
riety of sources. By comparison, the Coast Guard, an agency within the
103. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1994) (emphasis added).
104. The CWA defines the contiguous zone as three to twelve miles from the U.S. baseline. See
id. § 1362(7)-(9) (defining navigable waters, territorial seas, and contiguous zone); Convention of the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 33, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1612-13, 516 U.N.T.S.
205, 220-22 (defining contiguous zone as the area from three to twelve miles beyond the nation's
baselines). The CWA definition incorporates the relevant international convention existing at the
time of the CWA's enactment, although the more recent 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides that a nation's contiguous zone may extend out to 24 nautical miles
from its baselines. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), art. 33, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1276 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. Nations may
generally exercise jurisdiction over foreign flag vessels that violate its customs, fiscal, immigration, or
sanitary laws if the vessels are traveling within their contiguous zone. See id. art. 2; see also Dubner,
supra note 5, at 141 (noting that coastal states exercise almost exclusive jurisdiction over internal wa-
ters but cannot interfere with innocent passage of foreign vessels).
105. See cases cited supra note 92 (explicit exclusion of one thing negates implied exclusion of
another).
106. 16 U.S.C. § 4711(b)(2)(C), (c)(2)(J) (1994).
107. The legislative history of NISA indicates that Congress wanted to ensure that the CWA con-
tinue to govern the discharge of oily or chemical-laden ballast. See Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee, S. REP. No. 101-523 on S. 2244, at 6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6455,
6460 (S. 2244 was incorporated into H.R. 5390, which was then passed into law as the Nonindigenous
Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990, 16 U.S.C. § 4701 (1994), amended in 1996 by
the National Invasive Species Act (NISA)). However, there is no evidence that Congress intended to
limit this provision to ballast contaminated with oil or chemicals. To read such a limitation into the
statute would fail to do justice to the plain language of NISA's broadly phrased savings clause, in vio-
lation of the principle that the language of the statute itself, not the legislative statements, provides the
"authoritative expression" of the law. City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328,
337 (1994).
108. Exec. Order No. 13,112,64 Fed. Reg. 6183,6184 (1999).
No. 4] VIRTUES OF "COMMAND AND CONTROL" REGULATION 1249
Department of Transportation,1"9 has a wholly different mission- safety
on inland waters and territorial seas."0 Its responsibilities include en-
forcing federal laws on waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States; protecting life and property at sea; aiding navigation through ac-
tivities such as ice breaking; and maintaining readiness to function with
the Navy in time of war."l' The Coast Guard could advance the Order's
directive, as well as the objectives of both the CWA and NISA, by sup-
porting the EPA's efforts to control water pollution.
The CWA itself envisions working relationships between EPA and
other agencies, even those with development-oriented missions, in other
contexts. For example, the Army Corps of Engineers issues permits for
dredge and fill activities that affect wetlands under section 404, while the
EPA holds veto power over those permits.'12  The two agencies are re-
quired to jointly issue wetlands regulations. 13 Although the relationship
is not always an easy one,1 4 the different perspectives of the two agencies
contribute to the strength of the overall program."' Likewise, a coopera-
tive arrangement between the EPA and Coast Guard would be mutually
beneficial in the context of ballast-water discharges.
IV. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF REGULATORY PROGRAMS
Few would deny that the quality of surface waters in the United
States has improved immensely in the past quarter-century or that sig-
nificant progress has been made in cleaning up pollution from industrial
109. See 14 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). The Department of Transportation is generally known as a devel-
opment-oriented department. See Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats, Birds and B-A-T: The Convergent Evo-
lution of Environmental Law, 63 Miss. L.J. 403,454 (1994).
110. See 14 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
111. See id. § 2.
112. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1994); James City County v. EPA, 12 F.3d 1330,
1335 (4th Cir. 1993); 40 C.F.R. § 231.1(a) (1999).
113. See NRDC v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685,686 (D.D.C. 1975).
114. See, e.g., Bersani v. Robichaud, 850 F.2d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding the EPA veto of
CWA section 404 permit issued by Corps). See generally Heidi Wendel, Comment, Bersani v. EPA:
Toward a Plausible Interpretation of the 404(b) (1) Guidelines for Evaluating Permit Applications for
Wetland Development, 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 99, 104-07 (1990).
115. See Benjamin H. Grumbles & Kenneth J. Kopocis, The Water Resources Development Act of
1992: Expanding the "Corps of Environmental Engineers", [1993] 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,379, 10,389 (June 1993) (noting that, in carrying out the CWA's goals, both Congress and the EPA
may justifiably rely more on the Corps' expertise "in water management, wetlands protection, and
other issues addressing both water quality and quantity"). "As water quality and quantity issues be-
come increasingly linked, so too will activities of EPA and the Corps." Id.
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point sources."6 Sections 301 and 402 of the CWA "deserve[] a lion's
share of the credit.""
I7
A. The Efficacy of Regulatory Programs Versus Economic Initiatives
In keeping with the recent hue and cry for regulatory reform,"'
economic solutions have found favor in academia" 9 and both federal ex-
ecutive and legislative initiatives. 12  However, regulatory approaches
116. See Debra L. Donahue, The Untapped Power of Clean Water Act Section 401, 23 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 201, 202-03 (1996); see also Brian Weeks, Trends in Regulation of Stormwater and Nonpoint
Source Pollution, [1995] 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,300, 10,301 (June 1995) (noting that the
CWA has "drastically reduced surface water pollution from point sources"); Houck, supra note 109, at
417 (discussing drop in point source discharges due to the CWA).
117. William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Seven Statutory Wonders of U.S. Environmental Law: Origins
and Morphology, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1009, 1011 (1994). There are, of course, divergent viewpoints
on this particular point, but those are, perhaps, more a matter of perception than of fact. As Professor
Oliver Houck so aptly put it: "The success of technology-based standards in abating toxic water pollu-
tion depends largely on one's predisposition to enjoy the donut or regret the hole." Houck, supra note
1. For example, Daniel Cole & Peter Grossman make a well-reasoned argument, using extensive eco-
nomic data for Clean Air Act programs, that regulatory programs in general are cost effective. See
Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Tech-
nology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protec-
tion, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 887 (1999). Curiously, they then note in passing that the costs imposed by the
CWA have outweighed water-quality benefits. See id. at 937. The CWA's costs were estimated at
between $25 and $30 billion, while the range of estimated benefits varied from $6 to $28 billion. See
id. at 937 n.162 (citing A. Myrick Freeman III, Water Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 97, 125-26 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990)). The referenced study may
understate benefits if, instead of focusing on improvements made in point source pollution reduction,
it includes water-quality problems caused by nonpoint source pollution; one could well conclude that
very little improvement has been made on that front. See Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs, Are We There
Yet?: The Long Road Toward Water Quality-Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, [1997] 27
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,391, 10,401 (Aug. 1997).
118. Regulatory reform has gained renewed interest and vigor since a Republican-controlled
Congress took its seat in 1994, but it had its supporters in earlier years as well, especially during the
Reagan Administration. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65
TEX. L. REV. 1243 (1987): Dale B. Thompson, Beyond Benefit-Cost Analysis: Institutional Transaction
Costs and Regulation of Water Quality, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 517 (1999). Most recently, a bill to rein
in the EPA by forcing a consideration of the economic impacts of certain regulatory decisions has
been introduced in the 106th Congress. See Air Quality Standard Improvement Act of 2000, 146
CONG. REC. S2236, S2237 (sponsored by Sen. Voinovich, R-OH).
119. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 74-110 (1990); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 276
(1997); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1333 (1985); Richard B. Stewart, Models for Environmental Regulations: Central Planning Versus
Market-Based Approaches, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 547, 550-52 (1992); Symposium, Free Market
Environmentalism: The Role of the Market in Environmental Protection, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
297 (1992).
120. See, e.g., EPA, Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282-83 (1995)
(proposed May 23, 1995) (proposing "Project XL" to provide businesses greater flexibility in meeting
environmental goals and embracing "Common Sense Initiative" to allow six industries to develop
"cleaner, cheaper, smarter" approaches to regulation). The Clinton Administration has "jumped on
the reinvention band-wagon by announcing several initiatives to further this goal," including a pro-
posal to extend compliance schedules for effluent standards for companies adopting innovative ap-
proaches for pollution prevention. Paula C. Murray, Inching Toward Environmental Regulatory Re-
form- ISO 14000: Much Ado About Nothing or a Reinvention Tool?, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 35, 37 (1999)
(citing BILL CLINTON & AL GORE, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 43 (1995)); see also
Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environ-
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have a well-proven track record in the abatement of water pollution, and
there is no reason to believe that it is time to throw out the proverbial
baby with the bath water simply because "command-and-control" regula-
tion does not always render optimal economic efficiency.
1. Looking Back: Regulatory History and Experience
It is often said that hindsight is twenty-twenty. Of course, taking
heed of this perspective is another matter altogether.
If men could learn from history, what lessons it might teach us!
But passion and party blind our eyes, and the light which experi-
ence gives is a lantern on the stern, which shines only on the waves
behind us! 2'
Coleridge's poetic statement illuminates the history of U.S. efforts
to control water pollution, counseling against dramatic reforms. Al-
though technology-based regulatory programs may well be imperfect,'22
they have been an enormous on-the-ground success,12 3 yielding measur-
able net benefits to society.124 There is little doubt that the shift to tech-
nology-based controls in the Federal Water Pollution Control Amend-
ments of 1972 resulted in significant process changes, as well as
measurable pollution abatement, for the first time in years of federal in-
volvement in water quality.
125
Prior to 1972, the federal approach was largely concentrated on
providing grants to the states to encourage improvement in environ-
mental performance. When federal funding initiatives failed to address
discharges from chronic pollution sources, like publicly owned sewage-
treatment plants (POTWs), the CWA was amended to limit discharges to
a specified level based on the technological capacity of the category of
discharger in question. For POTWs, this meant secondary treatment,
along with pretreatment requirements for toxic pollutants and phased-in
regulation of storm water overflows. 126 Finally, significant progress oc-
curred. 127
mental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 307 (1999) (noting that the "Clinton Administration has
shown particular interest in renegotiating regulatory standards").
121. Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1831), in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 157:20 (3d
ed. 1980).
122. See ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER AT 20 YEARS LATER 150-70 (1993).
123. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Tech-
nology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729, 743.
124. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 117, at 917-18 (assessing benefits attributable to Clean Air
Act technology-based standards).
125. See Oliver A. Houck, supra note 109, at 418, 463; see also Shapiro & McGarity, supra note
123, at 746 n.96 (reporting that the CWA's initial performance standards caused "some impressive
reductions in conventional pollutant discharges," citing data on reductions from pulp and paper mills
from 1973 to 1984, in COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS 31 (1989)).
126. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(b)(2), 1317(b), 1342(p) (1994).
127. See generally Valentina 0. Okaru, Financing Publicly Owned Treatment Works and Institut-
ing Enforcement Measures Against Non-Compliant Works Under the Clean Water Act, 2 BUFF. ENVTL.
L.J. 213 (1994). Federal funding is still a component of the POTW program, but before obtaining
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This movement toward technology-based controls can best be de-
scribed as the "convergent evolution" of successful environmental law:
over the course of time, the job of pollution prevention selected the
proper tool.128 In the water-quality context, the NPDES permit program
emerged as the proper tool. Its technology-based standards won "their
primacy because other approaches simply couldn't hold their terrain. 129
By providing the necessary pressure of outside-in federal regulation, the
"best available technology" (BAT) standard became "the most effective
pollution-control program in the world in terms of producing identifiable
abatement-short of outright bans-if only because alternative pro-
grams have proven equally burdensome and so much less effective."130
Although in theory economic and regulatory programs appear
vastly different, in implementation, the differences between well-
designed, effective economic tools and regulation are not that significant.
In fact, the few economic initiatives currently utilized in the United
States for controlling pollution have adopted many of the features of
regulatory regimes.3 The most successful market-based pollution con-
trol tool, the Clean Air Act's acid rain program for trading sulfur dioxide
emissions, operates within a "command-and-control" framework where
predetermined emission caps limit the operation of market forces.32 It
also entails a substantial governmental role in overseeing trading activity
and compliance with caps. And, as the Clean Air Act itself demon-
funds, "the applicant for a federal construction grant must show that its project is the most economical
means of meeting effluent and water quality goals in a specific geographic area." G. Nelson Smith IlI,
Lawmaker as Lawbreaker: Enforcement Actions Against Municipalities for Failing to Comply with the
Clean Water Act, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 685, 700-01 (1993).
128. Houck, supra note 109, at 407, 427-28.; see also Cole & Grossman, supra note 117, at 894,
914-35 (describing regulatory evolution, focusing on the Clean Air Act); Samuel P. Hays, The Future
of Environmental Regulation, 15 J.L. & CoM. 549, 550 (1996) (noting the incremental nature of change
in environmental regulation).
129. Houck, supra note 109, at 427; see Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law and Three
Economies: Navigating a Sprawling Field of Study, Practice and Societal Governance in Which Every-
thing is Connected to Everything Else, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 366, 374-78, 379-82 (1999)
(generally discussing historic failure of market economics to address environmental problems).
130. Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, [1991] 21
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,528, 10,541-42 (Sept. 1991); see also Houck, supra note 109, at 417-
24 (describing gains made in the reduction of emissions going into water and other media under "best
available technology" approaches currently required by various pollution-control statutes). Winston
Churchill's quote about democracy as the best form of government is analogous, and can be easily
adapted to describe technology-based regulation: "No one pretends that [it] is perfect or all-wise....
[lit has been said that [it] is the worst form of [control] except all those other forms that have been
tried from time to time." THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 150:19 (3d ed. 1980).
131. See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the
Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 293 (1998)
(noting that the schism between the two is not so great as one might imagine); Bruce A. Ackerman &
Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13
COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 171, 171 (1988) (describing conflict between market incentives versus regulatory
bureaucracy as a false dichotomy).
132. Cole & Grossman, supra note 117, at 892 (citing J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK,
POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM 15 (1998) (noting that "the
differences between command-and-control regulations and economic instruments ... is 'not as stark as
it appears"')).
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strates, whether an economic or a regulatory approach is adopted as the
pollution-control methodology of choice, economic impacts and incen-
tives will undoubtedly occur. 133
Yet the White Paper and an array of scholars and legislators criticize
regulatory approaches for failing to effectuate an optimal ratio of bene-
fits over costs. In a market-based economy such as that of the United
States, economic efficiency is undoubtedly one goal of legislation."3 Ad-
vocates of regulatory devolution go wrong, however, in their tendency to
assume that economic efficiency is the only, or at least the most impor-
tant, goal of environmental legislation. Other key values, such as
sustainability, equity, environmental justice, and even a "land ethic," de-
serve at least as much attention.'35 Absent regulatory forces, these values
tend to get side-lined when left to the marketplace.
Even if economic returns were the primary concern, existing studies
do not necessarily support the argument that technology-based regula-
tion is less efficient than market-based programs.'36 The Corporate Av-
erage Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards imposed by the Clean Air Act
provide an example of a regulatory program that has been found "twice
as important" as gasoline prices in stimulating automobile manufacturers
to develop fuel-efficient vehicles.'37 Moreover studies have shown re-
peatedly that economic objectives are undermined when "free" resources
like clean air and clean water are exploited.'38 The absence of regulatory
133. See infra Part IV.B (discussing efficacy of emission-trading programs).
134. See Plater, supra note 129, at 366 (noting that the marketplace is arguably "the single most
dominant structure of human organization today,.., the structure and processes of the marketplace
powerfully drive the choices of what will and will not be done by all participants").
135. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC: AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 201-26
(1949); MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH 195-96 (1988); Marshall J. Breger et al., Pro-
viding Economic Incentives in Environmental Regulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 463, 481-82 (1991); Er-
win Bulte & G.C. Van Kooten, Economic Science, Endangered Species, and Biodiversity Loss, 14
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 113,118 (2000); Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 123, at 743.
136. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 117, at 892 (describing market proponents as "ahistorical
and acontextual" in their assessments).
137. Id. at 891-92 (citing David L. Greene, CAFE or Price? An Analysis of the Effects of Federal
Fuel Economy Regulations and Gasoline Price on New Car MPG, 1978-89, 11 ENERGY J. 37, 37
(1990)).
138. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 168 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); see also R.H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (explaining why cost externalization is a
logical and powerful tendency in human behavior); Plater, supra note 129, at 365 (describing the "uni-
versal tendency.., toward cost externalization"); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Facing a Time of Counter-
Revolution- The Kepone Incident and a Review of First Principles, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 657, 660
(1995).
Rachel Carson showed us... that this tendency is dominated by short-term individualized think-
ing and can be quite dysfunctional in overall terms. Humans, corporations, and disparate seg-
ments of the environment are not dissociated individual islands floating in a vacuum; they live in
a web of direct and indirect interconnections. Externalities go somewhere and tend to have seri-
ous accumulated consequences that can end up dwarfing the short term actions that spawned
them. Then and now, however, humans and their marketplace do not voluntarily rush to take
into account the negative effects of what they do, so law is necessary and inevitable.
Id. at 660 (citing RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962)).
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mechanisms to internalize costs otherwise shared by the public at large
inevitably leads to a "Tragedy of the Commons."'3
To the extent that excess costs do occur as a result of regulatory
programs, economic initiatives, whether in the form of subsidies, taxes,
or trading programs, share a variety of arguably more serious deficien-
cies. Such defects can sometimes be disguised, however, by the econo-
mists' failure to fully account for the institutional, political, and temporal
context of the pollutant or activity of concern. Of course, both regula-
tory adherents and market proponents can be accused of overlooking the
nuances of context in weighing alternative pollution-abatement initia-
tives. But market proponents have demonstrated a tendency to ignore
fluctuations over time in marginal costs, societal values, technological
capabilities, and governmental institutions, all of which are critical in as-
sessing the true benefits and costs of an economic program."
For example, when pollution-control requirements are first im-
posed, the incremental costs of attaining environmental improvement are
relatively low because the least expensive approaches are generally im-
plemented first, resulting in the largest gains in abatement. Additional
abatement increments grow more and more expensive over time, after
the "quick fix" has been exhausted. Meanwhile, monitoring equipment
to accurately measure pollution at the source may become more readily
available, suggesting a more dire situation than previously realized. By
focusing on the latter stages of a regulatory life span, market proponents
can make the case that established regulatory programs are too expen-
sive. However, over time, as abatement costs begin to rise, so do incen-
tives to develop less-expensive new technologies. 41 Ultimately, once im-
proved abatement technologies and monitoring capacities are in place,
more finely tuned controls are made possible, and economic initiatives
may well become a feasible supplement, rather than distinct alternative,
to the regulatory regime.142
Proponents of economic approaches also tend to understate the dif-
ficulties of estimating both economic and environmental benefits and
costs at any given point in the contextual spectrum.143 Ecological costs
139. Hardin, supra note 138.
140. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 117, at 892.
141. See id. at 893-94; Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental
Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 1, 4-15 (1991); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr.,
Environmental Policy- It Is Time for a New Beginning, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 111, 113 (1989).
142. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 117, at 930-31,933 (discussing development of continuous-
emission monitors for electric power plants, and the subsequent success of the 1990 Clean Air Act's
sulfur dioxide emissions-trading program).
143. See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 123, at 735-36. Shapiro and McGarity make the case
that the economists' position that the costs of "overregulation" exceed its benefits are based on "vast
technical uncertainties and anchorless moral judgments reflected in the cost-benefit calculations for
health and safety standards." Id. For example, regulatory critics argue that the vinyl chloride safety
standard saves only one life per year at a cost of $40 million. See id. at 731-33 (discussing J.
MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF Toxic SUBSTANCES REGULATION: How OVERREGULATION
CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA 3, 22 (1988) and Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance,
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and benefits are likely to be significantly undervalued when placed
within the rubric of marketplace economics.'" The Department of Inte-
rior has grappled with this problem for years in promulgating regulations
for the assessment of natural-resource damages. A key component of its
final regulations was invalidated because its assessment methodology re-
lied too heavily on market or "use" value of the lost or damaged re-
source. 45 The government could not show- and in fact had "made no
claim"-that use value would actually pay for restoration, replacement,
or acquisition of equivalent resources, as required by the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Recovery Act (CER-
CLA).'" Indeed, the Department "could not possibly maintain that re-
covering $15 per pelt for the fur seals killed by a hazardous substance
release would enable the purchase of an 'equivalent' number of fur
seals. "'
As for costs, an economic-incentive program, whether tax-based or
otherwise, could be equally, or even more, expensive than a technology-
based regulatory program. The transaction costs and information costs
associated with market-based initiatives tend to be relatively high. 48 In
addition, monitoring and enforcement costs may be higher, as economic
approaches provide incentives to hide emissions to avoid pollution taxes
or maximize subsidies.'49 Inspectors would be required to monitor the
amount of pollution emitted from all possible discharge points on an ag-
gressive and continuous basis to assess the appropriate amount of a pol-
lution tax or subsidy, an expensive and labor-intensive endeavor 5 ° Con-
versely, regulatory strategies are generally less expensive to monitor and
enforce because inspectors need only determine whether the discharge at
the discharge point meets the BAT-based effluent limitations or, in the
case of performance standards, whether the required technology has
been installed and is being properly operated. 5'
1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 629-30). Shapiro and McGarity respond that this calculation is based on ex-
tremely limited risk-assessment tools. See id. at 733-35. It fails to account for the regulation's numer-
ous benefits other than saving lives (e.g., the mental and emotional well-being attendant to maintain-
ing a productive workforce free of nonfatal diseases), and is based on a willingness-to-pay model
defined by the wage received for working in dangerous conditions, discounting the fact that many
workers simply cannot pay. See id.
144. See Plater, supra note 129, at 374-77, 379.
145. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(1) (1994).
147. Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d at 445.
148. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 117, at 890-92.
149. See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 123, at 749.
150. See id.
151. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 117, at 918-19 (finding that monitoring and enforcement
costs tend to be higher for market-based programs). The CWA gives the EPA explicit authority to
impose record-keeping, sampling, and reporting requirements, and to inspect and gather data on the
premises, see Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a) (1994), thus keeping enforcement costs lower than
might otherwise be the case. See generally Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency:
Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267,
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2. Looking Forward: Regulatory Staying Power and Innovation
Perhaps the predominant criticism of regulatory programs is that es-
tablishing emission levels based on current technology squelches future
innovation. It stands to reason that industry would be reluctant to invest
in the research and development of new control methods when it knows
that operational costs will increase as the BAT standard is ratcheted
up.152 Although this is a legitimate concern, there is another side to the
story.
[O]stensibly cost-blind standards can help stimulate the develop-
ment of improved pollution control technology.... Regulations
that confront industry with the prospect of substantial compliance
costs create greater incentives for the development of cheaper con-
trol technology. Time and time again, after regulations have gone
into effect, regulatory targets have proven able to do what they pre-
viously claimed was impossible when they were seeking to forestall
the regulations. A study of industrial responses to regulation found
that the stringency of regulation was "the most important factor in-
fluencing technological innovation."''
Moreover, polluters themselves are not the only potential source of
pollution-control innovations. As a case in point, the new source-
performance standards required by the 1970 Clean Air Act resulted in
the dramatic growth of independent environmental industries, who raced
to invent "green" technologies in hopes of capturing emerging new mar-
kets.'54
In comparison, economic incentives, such as subsidies or taxation,
do not necessarily stimulate environmental improvement and may even
result in fewer emission-reducing innovations than regulatory controls.'55
Economic subsidies- actions that provide commodities, capital, or serv-
ices at below market cost- are especially unlikely to encourage techno-
logical advancement. Certainly, subsidies can be appropriate to redress a
1270-71 (1985) (concluding that regulatory programs result in decreased costs for information collec-
tion and evaluation, and greater consistency and predictability of results).
152. See Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why is This Thoroughbred
Hobbled?, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 234-36 (1988); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 279 (2d ed. 1977); Reeves, White Paper, supra note 3, § 10.3 (quoting a vice presi-
dent of Chrysler, discussing achievable technology for reducing emissions, "We're all worried that if
we sound hopeful, what will the damned standards be tomorrow?").
153. Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental Policy, 1997 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 179 (1997) (citing Nicholas A. Ashford, Understanding Technological Responses of
Industrial Firms to Environmental Problems: Implications for Government Policy, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRY 282 (Kurt Fischer & Johan Schot, eds., Island 1993)).
154. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 117, at 911 n.56 (citing Robert Repetto, Air Quality Under
the Clean Air Act, in INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 221, 276-77 (Thomas C. Schel-
ling ed., 1983)). In 1996, the U.S. environmental-technologies industry "produced $436 billion in
global revenues and employed 1.3 million people." Id. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ENVI-
RONMENTAL INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES: OVERVIEW BY STATE AND METROPOLITAN
STATISTICAL AREA 1 (Oct. 1997)).
155. See David M. Driesen, supra note 131, at 294.
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private-market failure, as in mass transit, or where public needs would
otherwise go unmet, as in parks, the arts, and occasionally, scientific re-
search.'56 Finely tuned subsidies to private-sector industry may even be
unobjectionable if necessary to maintain community stability or advance
other legitimate public policies.'57 Government support for various New
Deal programs during the Great Depression, for example, made sense
given the need to promote economic development, increase employment
and overall living conditions, and protect or restore natural resources in
the face of dust-bowl conditions.' Similarly, the "Swamp Buster" provi-
sions of various federal farm bills, mandating cuts in existing subsidies for
farmers who convert wetlands to crop production,'59 have had beneficial
environmental effects, likely because land-use controls are otherwise so
difficult to regulate at the federal level."6
Governmental programs aimed at supporting the economic position
of particular industries must be subject to constant reevaluation to en-
sure continued efficacy in light of changing circumstances. Economic
supports should be designed in a way that ultimately eliminates the need
for their continued existence.' In the case of contaminated ballast-
water discharges, where industry is externalizing pollution-control costs
and imposing them on the general public, subsidies are most likely not
appropriate at all.'62 Even those who laud incentive-based instruments as
the method of choice for controlling pollution generally agree that subsi-
dies are an inefficient tool for achieving environmental quality because
the resulting reductions in operational costs can attract new entrants and
156. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE
FUTURE OF THE WEST 19 (1992).
157. See id.
158. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND ThE NEW DEAL 157-58,
172-73 (Harper Paperback 1963) (discussing soil conservation measures and the Rural Electricifica-
tion Administration); David A. Taylor, A Noble and Absurd Undertaking, 30 SMITHSONIAN 100, 108
(2000) (by supporting authors like Richard Wright, Studs Terkel, and Margaret Walker, the Works
Progress Administration federal writers' project "fostered 'what nobody believed was possible at that
time - a renaissance of the arts and American culture"').
159. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 3821 (1994).
160. See Oliver Houck, TMDLs IV: The Final Frontier, [1999] 29 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,469, 10,483 (Aug. 1999) (noting success of swamp buster programs); Linda A. Malone, Reflections
on the Jeffersonian Ideal of an Agrarian Democracy and the Emergence of an Agricultural and Envi-
ronmental Ethic in the 1990 Farm Bill, 12 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1993) (describing conservation pro-
grams).
161. See WILKINSON, supra note 156, at 19 (citing U.S. CONG., JOINT ECON. COMM., 89TH CONG.,
1ST SESS., SUBSIDY AND SUBSIDY-EFFEcT PROGRAMS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 1 (Comm. Print
1965)).
162. Subsidizing the shipping industry for abating discharges of contaminated ballast water is all
the more inappropriate in the Great Lakes because, as noted in the White Paper, the Great Lakes
shipping industry is already subsidized as a result of the initial and ongoing government support for
the construction and maintenance of the Saint Lawrence Seaway. See Reeves, White Paper, supra note
3, § 10. The implications of any form of pollution abatement subsidy would require detailed economic
assessment and consistent monitoring throughout implementation to determine the extent of synergis-
tic or unintended effects.
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greater investments in the polluting industry, creating perverse incentives
for the industry to increase overall net emissions.163
Likewise, taxation, although held in "nearly reverential regard" by
proponents of economic initiatives for accomplishing environmental
quality,"6 is not without problems and would not necessarily stimulate
rapid innovations. Assuming that a ballast-water tax applied to foreign
vessels is allowed by international trade agreements, 65 the tax rate itself
would need to be reevaluated almost continually to ensure that it is set at
an appropriate and effective level. Because there is virtually no way to
calculate with precision exactly how much abatement will result from any
given pollution tax, rates must be adjusted over time to meet abatement
goals."6 Yet, legislatures are historically unwilling to revise tax rates af-
ter they are initially set.167  "[T]he current income tax system, with its
monument to the ingenuity of tax avoidance, does not inspire optimism
on this point."'"
During the time it takes for the taxation system to reach "steady
state," proceedings to establish or adjust a tax rate will be highly conten-
tious and time-consuming (that is, unless society is willing to tolerate
high exposure levels in the interim). 169  Industry tends to resist any
change to status quo, both because change typically requires immediate
capital outlays and because it results in devaluation of existing expertise
within firms. 7° As a result, implementation of a pollution tax is likely to
be far slower than aggressive implementation of the current regulatory
scheme.' Given the existing uncertainties about the presence, potential
for entry, and severity of effects of the next aquatic invader, the added
163. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal
Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 726-27 (1999) (citing WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE
THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 211-28 (2d ed. 1988) (1975)). In addition, "compensating risk-
makers for their costs of abatement (under subsidies) will induce risk-makers to make more risk." Id
at 726 n.186.
164. Id. at 727 (citing Frank S. Arnold, The Economist's Perspective: Why There Are No Pollution
Taxes, ENVTL. F., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 14).
165. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308, art. III. See generally Robert Charles Griffitts, Note, Broadening the States'
Power to Tax Foreign Multinational Corporations: Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board, 46 CAT.
U. L. REV. 243 (1996).
166. See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 123, at 748.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 749.
169. Id. at 745.
170. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 117, at 924, 926. In fact, although the United States has
embraced emissions trading as a supplemental tool to control air emissions, there are no environ-
mental taxes in place, perhaps because organized special interests (industry) have strenuously resisted
the idea. See David M. Driesen, Choosing Environmental Instruments in a Transnational Context, 27
ECOLOGY L.O. 1, 45 (2000) (explaining avoidance of taxation schemes through public-choice political
theory).
171. See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 123, at 744-45.
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uncertainty as to the appropriate level of taxes, along with the attendant
delays of shifting to a new program, may well be intolerable. 171
In contrast, regulatory requirements that force the adoption of im-
proved technology will result in timely emission reduction, and perhaps
even greater efficiency and lower costs. 173  The best performers will not
necessarily be disadvantaged by technology-based effluent limitations.
The CWA's NPDES program can actually level the playing field for
companies that implement technological controls, because all facilities
within an industrial class are required to meet a minimum threshold of
"cleanliness. 1 74  Facilities that improve their environmental image by
adopting innovations in technology could gain competitive advantage if
their "green" reputation is touted through effective marketing and public
relations efforts. 75 Meanwhile, uniform standards decrease the likeli-
hood of social dislocation and "forum shopping" that can otherwise re-
sult in competitive disadvantages between geographical regions or be-
tween firms in regulated industries. 176  At the very least, over the years
"the BAT process has proven, against vigorous opposition and the most
dire predictions, that pollution could in fact be reduced without signifi-
cant losses in employment, competitiveness, control, or industrial
growth.
177
Implementation of the Clean Air Act has demonstrated that, al-
though industry routinely overestimates compliance costs, it subse-
quently achieves legislative goals without a loss in its ability to compete.
For example, the oil industry claimed that phasing out lead in gasoline
would cost ninety-five percent more than it actually did.178 Similarly, pes-
172. See id. at 745. The White Paper itself acknowledges that its conclusions raise "some highly
complex questions about the synergistic interaction of taxes, subsidies, and regulatory costs in various
competing segments of industry which are beyond the analysis I can present here." Reeves, White Pa-
per, supra note 3, § 10.3.
173. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV.
83, 94-100 (describing expeditious and efficacious nature of environmental technology-based stan-
dards); Houck, supra note 109, at 430 (noting that requirements for alternative technology, including
even outright bans of harmful substances, e.g., leaded gasoline and DDT, can force industry to find
alternative means of production or alternative, less-destructive products and, in doing so, save money
as well).
174. See Reeves, Exotic Politics, supra note 3, at 192 (noting that the shipping industry asked the
Vancouver Harbour Master to issue a standing order making a voluntary ballast-exchange initiative
into a mandatory program); Reeves, White Paper, supra note 3, § 7.4.
175. Cf Wagner, supra note 173, at 108-09 (describing competitive advantages for existing
sources that engineer the development of improved technologies).
176. See Latin, supra note 151, at 1270-71; see also NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (effluent limitations imposed by NPDES permits impose minimum, uniform floors below
which neither individual nor jurisdictional efforts may sink, thereby avoiding the "race to the bottom"
that would otherwise result among jurisdictions with different requirements).
177. Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, [1991] 21
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L Inst.) 10,528, 10,541-42 (Sept. 1991).
178. See Alan S. Miller, Environmental Regulation, Technological Innovation, and Technology-
Forcing, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1995, at 64, 67; Percival, supra note 153, at 168-70. Ironi-
cally, although Nixon's proposal for a stiff tax on lead additives in 1971 to encourage their phase-out
was given short shrift by Congress at the time, the subsequent inclusion of mandatory lead phase-out
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simistic estimates of the costs of the acid rain program adopted in the
1990 Clean Air Act amendments were overstated by almost fifty percent,
as emissions trading and regulatory restrictions encouraged the use of
low-sulfur western coal and scrubbers, and utilities responded favorably
to rewards for conservation and renewable energy.'79 Also as a result of
the 1990 amendments, ozone-depleting CFCs were phased-out, and
ozone-friendly substitutes became more readily available. 80
Regulatory programs often are accused of rewarding older, dirtier
plants through "grandfather" provisions, providing them with an incen-
tive to continue relatively cheap operations while placing new technolo-
gies and firms at a disadvantage.'81 Although stringent, the CWA's pro-
visions for new sources do not necessarily inhibit new construction. The
CWA does not mandate the creation of new technology out of whole
cloth, but simply requires new sources to adopt the best technologies al-
ready demonstrated for use by the industry in question.82 Once the ap-
plicable standard is applied to the new source, that source will not be
subjected to more stringent standards of performance during the ten-
year period following completion of construction, or depreciation or am-
ortization of the facility, whichever date is earlier.'83 Thus, the new
source requirement is unlikely to put most shippers in economic jeop-
ardy, assuming they had economically viable operations in the first
place."8 Meanwhile, the effluent limitations for existing sources are to be
in the Clean Air Act is now described as "the singular success story in air pollution control." Id. at
168.
179. See Percival, supra note 153, at 168-70. The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act gave the
EPA authority to stimulate and support a market in emission allowances by conducting auctions of
those allowances. The allowance price for the EPA auction was set at $1,500 per ton. See Auctions,
Direct Sales and Independent Power Producers Written Guarantee Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 65,592
(1991); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7651c tbl. A (Affected Sources and Units in Phase I and Their Sulphur Di-
oxide Allowances). At the time of enactment, industrial economists projected that the "cost" of sulfur
dioxide allowances would be up to $700 per ton. See New Strategies for a New Market: The Electric
Industry's Response to the Environmental Protection Agency's Sulfur Dioxide Emission Allowance
Trading Program, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 469, 475 (1995). When trading began, the actual cost turned out
to be around $150 per ton. See id. It was predicted that. as "industry develops and becomes more
competitive, however, utilities will have no choice but to adopt cost-effective and economically effi-
cient policies.... [As a result], the demand for emission allowances will increase and a strong and ac-
tive trading market will emerge." Id. at 491.
180. See Percival, supra note 153, at 168-70.
181. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 131, at 174 n.5 (citing sources regarding differential
treatment of old and new facilities); Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through
Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 158 (1988) (arguing that the more stringent treat-
ment of new sources encourages existing sources to prolong their design lives and discourages new
sources, with state-of-the-art water pollution technology, from entering the market); Reeves, White
Paper, supra note 3, § 10.
182. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B) (1994) (requiring best available demon-
strated technology (BADT)).
183. See33 U.S.C. § 1316(d) (1994).
184. See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 123, at 744 n.80 (reaching similar conclusion with re-
spect to the BAT standard applied to existing sources). Perhaps in recognition of the potential for
stringent BADT standards to create incentives to keep older, dirtier facilities operating, the EPA has,
on occasion, attempted to set BADT for new sources no higher than BAT, but these efforts have met
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reviewed and revised every five years, so that improvements in technol-
ogy will eventually find their way into the BAT standards for existing
sources.185 Existing sources could be forced to retire if they cannot meet
revised technology-based effluent limitations.
Without question, the statutory regime could do a better job of en-
couraging innovation and phasing out the oldest, dirtiest dischargers.
The BAT review and revision process, which has been bogged down with
the weight of industry resistance and litigation from both sides, 18 6 could
be enhanced in several ways. The EPA needs to obtain and devote more
resources to move the process along, while building a strong, defensible
administrative record for improved standards. In addition, the agency
could offer incentives to existing facilities that adopt cleaner technolo-
gies, and encourage them to share that technology with other facilities,
through competitive grants or finely focused short-term subsidies.
Alternatively, legislative amendments could be adopted to encour-
age emissions and technology trading,'87 or to explicitly phase-out old
vessels that refuse to retrofit or treat their ballast water to the greatest
degree allowed by advances in technology. Congress in recent years has
been able to design at least one technology-based regulatory regime that
has encouraged new sources to implement new technology, while phasing
out old, dirty facilities. The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990 imposes,
over a period of twenty years, a double-hull requirement for existing ves-
sels starting with the oldest, largest vessels. It also requires double hulls
for all new vessels built for oil transportation when they operate in U.S.
waters or the U.S. exclusive economic zone.'
The OPA has spurred active competition among naval architects to
build a safer supertanker, and the world's first double-hull supertanker
was completed in Denmark in 1992.89 Since the OPA was enacted, sig-
nificant declines in oil spills, both in number of incidents and amounts
with judicial disapproval. See Houck, supra note 109, at 463 (discussing litigation and reversal of pet-
rochemical industrial standards, in Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 883 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1989)).
185. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(d) (1994).
186. See Houck, supra note 109, at 456 & n.240-41. Another potential "loophole" for existing
sources is found in CWA section 301(c), which allows modification from uniform effluent limitations
for a variety of reasons, including the facility's "economic capability." 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c).
187. See Natalie M. Derzko, Using Intellectual Property Law and Regulatory Processes to Foster
the Innovation and Diffusion of Environmental Technologies, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 30-32
(1996). For discussion of emissions-trading programs, see infra Part IV.B.
188. See 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a) (1994); Double Hull Standards for Vessels Carrying Oil in Bulk, 57
Fed. Reg. 36,222 (1992) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 155, 157, 46 C.F.R. pts. 30, 32, 70, 90, 172). For ex-
isting vessels, the double-hull requirement is phased in over several years, depending upon the size
and age of the vessel, beginning in 1995, and proceeding in stages until 2010, when all vessels over 5000
gross tons must be equipped with double hulls. See Jeffery D. Morgan, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990:
A Look at Its Impact on the Oil Industry, 6 FORDHAM ENvTL. L.J. 1, 7 (1994).
189. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY
145 (2d ed. 1996) (citing Richard L. Hudson, Tanker Safety Plans are Mulled as Oil Spill Threatens
Shetlands, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 1993, at A7B).
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
spilled, have occurred, I"' and although freight rates increased by ap-
proximately ten percent, 91 the flow of oil being shipped to the United
States has continued with no significant interruptions. t92 Attesting to the
OPA's efficacy, the International Maritime Organization has followed
suit by adopting regulations that will require double hulls or equivalent
safety features for all new oil tankers. 93
B. Supplementing Regulation with Economic Incentives
Once regulations are in place, technological improvement could be
encouraged through supplemental market-based tools.194 The emissions
trading program of the 1990 Clean Air Act, for example, has enjoyed
success not by replacing national air-quality standards, but by providing
flexibility in reaching predetermined goals - the permissible levels of ex-
posure already set by the Act.195
Emissions-trading programs authorize polluters to receive and ex-
change permits, which allow a certain amount of pollution emission.
Permit recipients have several choices: they may emit only the amount
of pollution allowed by the permit; they may buy additional permits to
emit more than would otherwise be allowed; or they may reduce emis-
sions and sell excess permit allowances. As a result, polluters that can
190. The Coast Guard reported the following data for U.S. waters: 1991- three spills totaling
55,000 gallons (the lowest level in 14 years); 1992- 1 spill at 98,700 gallons; 1993- 1 spill releasing
33,500 gallons; 1994- 1 spill at 35,700 gallons. See id. at 144.
191. See id. at 143.
192. See id. at 145 (citing Reuters, Oil Supplies Unaffected by Tanker Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,
1994, at D4). Up until late 1999-early 2000, oil prices were the lowest seen in decades. See Continuing
Decline in Oil Prices Benefits Consumers and a Wide Range of Industries, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1998, at
A2; Jeffrey Ball, Gasoline Price Rise Worries Auto Makers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1999, at A2 (reporting
that, although oil prices rose somewhat during fall 1999, "[r]etail prices, adjusted for inflation, fell to
their lowest level last year since pump prices began to be tracked in 1918, according to the American
Petroleum Institute"). Crude oil prices have increased throughout 2000, due in part to high consumer
demand spurred by a strong economy, and to new federal mandates for cleaner-burning gasoline. See
Alexei Barrionuevo, New Environmental Rules and Production Worries Create Shortage Fears, WALL
ST. J., May 16,2000, at A2.
193. See PERCIVAL, supra note 189, at 145.
194. See Houck, supra note 109, at 427-31, 454 nn.226-28.
195. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651b (1994). Under Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990, annual emissions of sulfur dioxide, which, together with nitrogen oxide, contributes to
acid rain, must be reduced by 10 million tons by 2010. See id.; Theodore L. Garrett & Sonya D. Win-
ner, A Clean Air Act Primer: Part 1I, [1992] 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,235, 10,253-56 (Apr.
1992). Title IV provides that pollution allowances may be allocated to fossil-fuel, electric-utility gen-
erating units, based on the utility's past emissions and fuel consumption. See Garrett & Winner, supra.
Allowances over and above those needed for operation may be traded to other utilities, all the while
moving toward the overall emission goal. Tradable excess allowances may be obtained by abating
more than required by law or by implementing conservation plans, e.g., use of renewable energy
sources. See id. For a discussion of the effectiveness of Title IV in reducing interstate air pollution,
see Acid Rain: Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Drop 17 Percent in 1990-98 Period, GAO Report Indicates,
31 Env't Rep. (BNA) 577 (2000); Cole & Grossman, supra note 117, at 930-33; Dallas Burtraw &
Byron Swift, A New Standard of Performance: An Analysis of the Clean Air Act's Acid Rain Program,
[1996] 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,411 (Aug. 1996); Eileen L. Kahaner, GAO's Analysis of
Title IV's Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Allowance Trading Program, 2 ENVTL. LAW. 239, 251 (1995).
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reduce emissions most cheaply will sell extra allowances to those who
face higher abatement costs, thereby achieving economic efficiency."
Trading initiatives in general are cost effective only in situations
where regulated facilities face different marginal control costs, and where
reductions can be made more cheaply by some individual facilities than
by others.197 Although many categories of facilities and vessels subject to
the CWA may meet this criteria, it is not clear that existing law allows
trading as a supplement to the NPDES program, or that such a program
would be an effective tool for addressing ballast-water discharges.
Unlike the Clean Air Act, the CWA does not explicitly authorize
effluent-trading programs.198 The EPA, however, construes the CWA to
allow dischargers to trade waste load allocations as a means to imple-
ment the TMDL program for meeting water-quality standards.'99 The
Clinton administration's 1994 "Clean Water Initiative" lends its support
to trading programs, and recommends that the EPA study trading oppor-
tunities and publish additional guidance regarding possible pollutant
trades.'
Although emissions trading may well be a viable option for meeting
water-quality objectives through TMDLs, the NPDES program is less
amenable to trading. The TMDL requirement provides a relatively close
parallel to the Clean Air Act approach, by focusing on the achievement
196. See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Emissions Allowance Trading Under the Clean Air Act: A Model for
Future Environmental Regulations?, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 352, 355 (1999).
197. See Alexandra Teitz, Note, Assessing Point Source Discharge Permit Trading: Case Study in
Controlling Selenium Discharges to the San Francisco Bay Estuary, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 79, 81-82 (1994)
(noting that these factors allow a market to develop, but that transaction costs can "impose trading
barriers and reduce realizable cost savings"). For an interesting comparison of the costs of Germany's
effluent-trading system with the costs associated with the CWA's technology-based requirements, see
Thompson, supra note 118, at 538-39 (concluding that, depending on certain variables, including how
much industry spends to lobby Congress and the regulators, effluent trading may be more cost-
effective).
198. See Elise M. Fulstone, Effluent Trading: Legal Constraints on the Implenlentation of Market-
Based Effluent Trading Programs Under the Clean Water Act, 1 ENVTL. LAW. 459, 480-89 (1995) (con-
cluding that CWA amendment might be necessary before such trading would be allowed, citing, e.g.,
the antibacksliding provisions of 33 U.S.C. § 1342(o)); see also Teitz, supra note 197, at 108, 152 (con-
cluding that CWA section 402(a)-(b), which require NPDES permits to specify effluent limitations
unless elaborate modification procedures are met, "may significantly constrain the trading options cur-
rently available"). Fulstone recommends that Congress enact a variance from the CWA's technology-
based requirements for participants in qualified point source trading programs. See Fulstone, supra, at
489.
199. See U.S. EPA, GUIDANCE FOR WATER QUALITY-BASED DECISIONS: THE TMDL PROCESS
51 (EPA 440/4-91-001 Apr. 1991); see also Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(A) (1994) (efflu-
ent limitations based on TMDL may be revised if the water-quality standards will still be attained).
200. See U.S. EPA, President Clinton's Clean Water Initiative 66-69 (EPA 800-R-94-001) (Feb.
1994) <http://www.cleanwater.gov/>; Clean Water Act Plan, 63 Fed. Reg. 14,109 (1998). The Clean
Water Initiative states that the EPA should: "(1) 'establish criteria.., for prior approval of trades by'
the permitting and administering authorities; (2) 'specify that trades [may] not violate water quality
standards'; (3) 'specify that.., trades based on TMDLs may... take place' even though water-
quality standards have not been met; "(4) identify settings, based on models, that may complement
trading programs when on-site monitoring would be otherwise prohibitively expensive; (5) 'clarify that
the CWA's anti-backsliding provision ... does not prohibit trading'; and (6) authorize pretreatment
trading programs." Fulstone, supra note 198, at 462 n.8.
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of ambient levels of "clean" water.2 1 In contrast, each individual point
source must meet the technology-based effluent limitation applicable to
its industrial category under the NPDES program, regardless of the
quality of the receiving water body, and NPDES permits generally can-
not be revised to contain less stringent standards under the antibackslid-
ing provisions of the CWA. °2
Even if effluent trading could be used in tandem with the NPDES
program, it is not necessarily a desirable tool for regulating ballast-water
discharges. Trading programs are not particularly useful when the goal is
to achieve zero discharge; 20 3 there would be nothing left to trade. In ad-
dition, tradable emission permits can exacerbate barriers to market ac-
cess by new vessels and facilities and enhance the competitive edge of
existing vessels through rent-seeking behavior during the allocation pro-
cess.2' And while trading has worked well with respect to improving
ambient air quality and reducing emissions from stationary sources like
power plants, applying such a program to mobile ships, flying the flags of
various nations and utilizing multiple trade routes in and through the
Great Lakes, would be difficult at best.205
Finally, absent carefully designed geographic parameters, a trading
program could result in "hot spots"2' where exotic species are more
likely to be released or to gravitate. The Clean Air Act's acid rain pro-
gram stands accused of facilitating trades to Midwestern utilities, allow-
ing them to exceed their own sulfur dioxide allowances, thereby exacer-
bating pollution problems in surrounding areas.2 7 As a result of
201. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (1994) (TMDLs shall be allocated to meet water-quality
standards) with 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409, 7502(c)(2) (1994) (state implementation plans must make "reason-
able further progress" toward meeting National Ambient Air Quality Standards).
202. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), 1314(b), 1342(a)(1), (o).
203. Seeid. § 1251(a)(1).
204. See Hirsch, supra note 196, at 358. Existing utilities benefited from the Clean Air Act
scheme because sulfur dioxide allowances were initially allocated to them based on historic emission
levels, but new utilities are required to purchase allowances to commence operations. Id. at 380. The
concept of rent-seeking assumes that any ostensibly public-interest regulation that emerges from a
political process must have been designed to favor concentrated interests, such as subgroups of the
regulated industry attempting to burden their rivals. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political
Economy of Global Environmental Regulation, 87 GEO. L.J. 749, 754 (1999). In other words, "advo-
cacy groups use environmental regulation, not to achieve general environmental quality improvement
(a public good), but rather to deliver other more parochial ends (private goods)." Id at 755. For an
assessment of whether the implementation of the Clean Air Act's trading program ultimately lends
support to this theory, see Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political Economy of Market-
Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 41 J.L. & ECON. 37, 81 (1998) (concluding
that the actual allocation of allowances "appears more to be a majoritarian equilibrium than one
heavily weighted toward a narrowly defined set of economic or geographical interests. It is not
strongly consistent with the predictions of standard models of interest group politics").
205. See Driesen, supra note 170, at 3 (noting that "no international regime has an active allow-
ance trading program in place," and discussing the failure to agree on trading "ground rules" in the
climate change context).
206. See Fulstone, supra note 198, at 480 n.109. Hot spots are generally described as concentra-
tions of emissions within a particular geographic area. See Hirsch, supra note 196, at 393.
207. See Burtraw & Swift, supra note 195, at 10,421 (suggesting that a subregional cap could be
created for sensitive airsheds to address pollutant concentrations, but concluding that, "[in the long
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prevailing wind patterns, acid rain from these coal-fired power plants
tends to fall in the northeast. Ironically, northeastern utilities, which are
generally newer and cleaner, may end up fouling their own nest, so to
speak, by selling their allowances to the very Midwestern utilities that
send their excess sulfur dioxide emissions across state and regional lines.
As a result, the pollution problem cannot be attributed directly to the
power plant located in the affected area but instead to a distant source of
pollution, minimizing incentives for community mobilization and local
political pressure.
This is not to say that economic tools, such as trading programs, or
providing rebates for clean ballast or taxing dirty ballast, must be univer-
sally rejected. The use of these and other types of economic initiatives
should be explored in more detail, with appropriate consideration given
to context, to determine their potential for enhancing-but not replac-
ing- the underlying regulatory controls.
C. Public Involvement and Enforcement
The CWA permit program is all the more effective as a regulatory
tool because it provides opportunities for public involvement as well as
straightforward enforcement provisions, while economic initiatives gen-
erally lack these features. Before a permit may issue, the EPA must al-
low for public comment and determine that the discharge will comply
with the applicable requirements of the CWA. °8 Input received during
the public comment period is included as part of the administrative rec-
ord.2" At the close of the comment period, the Regional Administrator
decides whether to issue or deny the permit.2 ° Any interested person
may request a formal hearing within thirty days of the Administrator's
determination.21 These opportunities for involvement at various levels
of the decision making process assist the EPA in reaching a well-
informed decision, based not only on agency data but also on research
and opinions by interested parties, who often have vastly different per-
spectives.
term, an [overall national] emission cap system may do more for such sensitive regions because pollut-
ant loads do not increase with economic growth"); Kirsten Engel & Scott Saleska, Don't Trade Away
Benefits of Clean Air, BOSTON GLOBE, May 29, 2000, at A15 (suggesting that geographic constraints
on trading may be appropriate, along with reductions in the overall sulfur dioxide cap, to avoid hot-
spot problems in the northeast); see also Hirsch, supra note 196, at 373-74 (describing positions of in-
terested parties during congressional debates on sulfur dioxide trading program).
208. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 124.12(c) (1999). States that have assumed
delegated authority to administer the program also must allow opportunities for public input before
ruling on permit applications. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3); 40 C.F.R. § 123.25.
209. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 124.10, 124.12(a)(4).
210. See id. § 124.15.
211. See id. § 124.74(a).
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Once a permit is in place, the CWA provides for enforcement
through temporary or permanent injunctions, administrative, civil and
criminal penalties, and citizen suits.
212
This straightforward and effective enforcement scheme, in which
the permit holder must report on and be held accountable for its
compliance with its permit and which provides multiple opportuni-
ties for enforcement, including by citizens, did not come about by
accident. Congress consciously mandated an aggressive, effective
enforcement system when it drafted the Clean Water Act, provid-
ing, for example, for citizen suits. During Senate consideration of
the conference report in 1972, Sen. Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) said: "We
have learned by disappointing experience, Mr. President, that with-
out strict enforcement and meaningful deterrents, water pollution
control laws will have no real effect. The bill before us provides the
enforcement and deterrents we need. 213
Under section 309, the EPA can assess administrative penalties in
an amount up to $10,000 for each violation of a statutory or permit provi-
sion.214 If a judicial proceeding is initiated, civil penalties up to $25,000
per day for each violation may be assessed.215 First time offenders who
either negligently or knowingly violate a statutory or permit provision
can be assessed with criminal fines up to $25,000 per day of violations
and imprisonment for not more than one year, or $50,000 per day and
imprisonment for not more than three years, respectively.216 Fines go up,
as does the duration of potential jail time, if the violator is a repeat of-
fender, or knows that the violation puts another person in imminent dan-
ger of death or serious bodily injury.217
In addition, section 505 authorizes citizen suits "against any per-
son... who is alleged to be in violation of... an effluent standard or
limitation under this chapter., 218  Successful plaintiffs can recoup their
attorneys' fees and costs. 219 In enacting section 505, Congress recognized,
at least implicitly, that watchful citizens would be especially effective ad-
vocates.2 ' As a result of citizen-suit provisions like those found in the
212. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1365.
213. Drew Caputo, A Job Half Finished: The Clean Water Act After 25 Years, [1997] 27 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,574, 10,580 n.82 (Nov. 1997) (citing 1 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 216 (Comm.
Print compiled for the Senate Comm. on Pub. Works 1973)).
214. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2). States with approved programs are also given the authority to
assess penalties. See id. §§ 1319(a), 1342(b)(7).
215. See id. § 1319(b), (d).
216. See id. § 1319(c)(1)-(2).
217. See id. § 1319(c)(1)-(3).
218. Id. § 1365(a)(1). An "effluent standard or limitation" is defined as, among other things, an
unlawful act under CWA section 301(a). Id. § 1365(f).
219. See id. § 1365(d).
220. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 271 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that Con-
gress, through various provisions of the CWA, encouraged "citizen initiatives to enforce the water
pollution laws"); see also Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws,
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CWA, litigation has played a significant, and even dominant, role in
American environmental policy and law.22' The list of citizen suits that
have impacted the way business is done in the United States is impres-
sive, ranging from ConEdison's thwarted plan to build a huge hydroelec-
tric facility on Storm King Mountain, to the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity's confrontation with the infamous snail darter, to Disney's failed
attempts to build a ski resort in an isolated valley of the Sequoia Na-
tional Forest. 2
22
Citizen suits provide a vehicle for enforcement where the EPA has
been unwilling or unable to move forward due to lack of resources or
lack of political fortitude. 223 They are especially important to ensure the
implementation of politically charged programs like water-quality stan-
dards and pollutant allocations for nonpoint sources, many of which re-
quire changes in local land use planning. For example, the TMDL re-
quirement for addressing impaired water bodies was virtually ignored by
the EPA and the states until a series of citizen suits forced compliance. 24
It is fair to say that, without citizen enforcement, most environ-
mental programs would have "languish[ed] under the political con-
straints of the marketplace., 225  If not checked by aggressive enforce-
ment, particularly by citizens, industry almost inevitably bows to the
pressure to pollute: noncompliance yields direct economic benefits
through the free use of water for waste disposal, while compliance, re-
Part 1, [19831 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,309, 10,310-11 (Oct. 1983) (detailing legislative his-
tory of citizens' suits provisions).
221. See Claudia Polsky & Tom Turner, Justice on the Rampage, 21 AMICuS J. 34 (1999). "One of
the greatest elements of the U.S. system of environmental law, itself arguably the greatest in the world,
is the citizen lawsuit." Id.
222. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 624-
25 (2d Cir. 1965) (setting aside and remanding a Federal Power Commission license to construct
pumped-storage hydroelectric project at Storm King); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,
193-95 (1978) (enjoining construction of Tellico dam). In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740-41
(1972), the Court held that the Sierra Club did not have standing because it failed to allege that either
the organization or its members would be affected by Disney's proposed ski resort. In the end, how-
ever, the resort was never actually built. See RODGERS, supra note 220, at 209 n.12.
223. See Michael D. Axline & Patrick C. McGinley, Universal Statutes and Planetary Programs:
How EPA Has Diluted the Clean Water Act, 8 J. ENVTL L. & LITIG. 253, 287-88 (1993); Michael R.
Lozeau, Tailoring Citizen Enforcement to an Expanding Clean Water Act: The San Francisco
Baykeeper Model, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 429, 440 (1998) (describing role of NRDC in CWA
enforcement during diminished role of Reagan administration's EPA).
224. See Houck, supra note 117 at 10,395-97.
225. Plater, supra note 129, at 382-83 n.54; see JOHN CRONIN & ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., THE
RVERKEEPERS: Two ACTIVISTS FIGHT TO RECLAIM OUR ENVIRONMENT AS A BASIC HUMAN RIGHT
177-99 (1997) (discussing need for citizen enforcement in light of underenforcement by federal and
state environmental agencies due to "agency capture" by regulated industry, political pressure, and
budget shortfalls); Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985).
"Congress made clear that citizen groups are not to be treated as nuisances or troublemakers but
rather as welcomed participants in the vindication of environmental interests." Id (quoting Friends of
the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976)).
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quiring the construction and operation of expensive pollution removal
facilities, imposes hefty financial costs.22 6
In comparison, economic initiatives, whether in the form of subsi-
dies or taxation, generally inhibit citizen involvement. Citizens, as tax-
payers, often have difficulty establishing standing to challenge federal
spending programs in court.227  In Massachusetts v. Mellon,228 a taxpayer
alleged that Congress, in enacting the Maternity Act of 1921, had ex-
ceeded the spending power of Article I, Section 8, depriving her of prop-
erty without due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and had
invaded the legislative powers reserved to the states by the Tenth
Amendment. 229  The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer had no
standing to bring these general grievances about the conduct of govern-
ment or the balance of power in the federal system 3° Unless a taxpayer
alleges a violation of a specific constitutional limitation on the spending
power, such as the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the
challenge to a governmental tax or subsidy will be dismissed. 3  Public-
interest plaintiffs challenging economic programs applicable to ballast-
water discharges would most likely allege arbitrary and capricious action
under the EPA, 2 but such plaintiffs would presumably lack standing. 33
In sum, bringing ballast-water discharges into the CWA program
would result in almost immediate improvement. The CWA's provisions
for hefty civil and criminal penalties, along with citizen suits with attor-
ney fee awards, provide powerful incentives for dischargers to improve
operations as soon as possible.2" At the same time, the opportunity for
both industry and environmental interest groups to challenge EPA deci-
sions in court provides a tremendous incentive for the agency to equita-
bly and reasonably balance competing interests and embrace effective,
yet practical, solutions.235
226. See CRONIN & KENNEDY, supra note 225, at 178; cf. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693, 707 (2000) (discussing deterrent effect of CWA civil-penalty
awards).
227. See U.S. CONST. art. III (providing federal courts with jurisdiction to hear only cases or con-
troversies).
228. 262 U.S. 447,479 (1923).
229. See id.
230. See id. at 480.
231. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968) (noting that "one of the specific evils feared by
those who drafted the Establishment Clause ... was that the taxing and spending power would be used
to favor one religion over another or to support religion in general").
232. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
233. Challenges to economic incentive programs almost routinely are rejected for lack of stand-
ing, see Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,44-45 (1976); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 753 (1984), unless the plaintiff is directly affected as either a recipient of the subsidy in question,
see Sierra Club v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1996), or suffers competitive disadvantage due
to the program, see Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591,594 (7th Cir. 1995).
234. See Rodgers, supra note 117, at 1012, 1020-21 (noting that one of the reasons for the CWA's
successes in reducing water pollution is its effective system of monitoring, underscored by a highly ef-
fective citizen suit mechanism).
235. "Judicial review is one reason American environmental law works, and the quite similar laws
of other countries do not." Houck, supra note 109, at 467.
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V. THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF NPDES PERMITTING FOR
VESSELS
The regulation of ballast-water discharges through NPDES permits
will, no doubt, present a challenge, in part because the EPA does not
have the expertise in regulating ships that it does regulating industrial
dischargers. As a result, shipping companies and trade groups, accus-
tomed to dealing with national coast guards and port authorities, will be
resistant when the EPA jumps into the existing regulatory fray.
The more significant obstacle to effective ballast-water management
arises from the fact that commercial cargo ships are, by their very nature,
mobile, and not only originate from various nations but also frequently
cross jurisdictional lines. The CWA framework, where the EPA typically
delegates the NPDES permitting responsibilities to the states, each of
which may exercise authority over a vessel "point source" crossing
through its waters, poses special concerns when it comes to shipping.
Disparities among interested states are quite possible, because although
states cannot dip below the federal thresholds, each individual state can
impose more stringent controls than the effluent limitations established
by the EPA.236
The logistical difficulties inherent in regulating vessels and their
ballast-water discharges do not provide the EPA with an excuse to avoid
regulation altogether. Courts have flatly rejected the notion that "ad-
ministrative impossibility" justifies a refusal to require NPDES permits
for categories of point source dischargers.237 Instead, the EPA must re-
quire permits, but the CWA "gives [the] EPA considerable flexibility in
framing the permit to achieve a desired reduction in pollutant dis-
charges." 3 ' Accordingly, the EPA might opt for gross reductions in
pollutant discharges from a category of vessels, rather than engage in the
fine-tuning necessitated when numerical effluent limitations are incorpo-
rated in individual permits. "But this ambitious statute is not hospitable
to the concept that the appropriate response to a difficult pollution
problem is not to try at all."239
Even if the EPA initially addressed the problem of ballast-water
discharges by using a general-permit approach,2" performance would
improve. General permits, addressed to a class of point source discharg-
ers or a particular area or region, allow for public participation and re-
quire the EPA to focus on the effects of a region or category of activities
236. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 122.1(f) (1999); see also O'Toole,
supra note 84, at 45 (discussing the Navy's difficulties in complying with disparate state standards, and
noting that "no state has yet required the permitting of a U.S. Navy ship, though individual discharges
are being increasingly challenged").
237. NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1383 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
238. Id. at 1380.
239. Id.
240. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.28.
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and to revisit the issue every five years or less.241 In comparison, an ex-
emption like section 122.3242 "tends to become indefinite: the problem
drops out of sight, into a pool of inertia, unlikely to be recalled in the ab-
sence of crisis or a strong political protagonist., 243
A. Effluent Limitations for New and Existing Vessels
NPDES permits must include technology-based effluent limita-
tions,2" water-quality-related effluent limitations and water-quality stan-
dards, and ocean-discharge criteria.245 Effluent limitations vary according
to type of pollutant emitted, and whether the discharger is a new or ex-
isting source.
As discussed above, new sources are generally subject to the strict-
est standard of the CWA, the "best available demonstrated control tech-
nology" (BADT),46 regardless of the type of pollutants emitted. Pursu-
ant to section 306, BADT performance standards require the greatest
degree of effluent reduction achievable through the application of the
best demonstrated technology for an industrial class.247 The BADT stan-
dard can force changes in operating methods, processes or other alterna-
tives, "including, where practicable, a standard permitting no discharge
of pollutants. ' '2' Because new sources have the opportunity to install the
best and most efficient production processes and wastewater-treatment
technologies, generally at lower cost than retrofitting existing facilities,
BADT "should represent the most stringent numerical values attainable
through the application of the best available control technology" for all
types of pollutants.249
A source is considered "new" if construction began after proposed
regulations establishing performance standards for the relevant category
of sources are published °.2 " BADT has only been prescribed for a limited
241. See NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d at 1382; see, e.g., Final NPDES General Permits for Storm
Water Discharges Associated with Industrial Activity, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,236 (1992) (providing for gen-
eral permits for storm water discharges, and requiring facilities to "implement a site-specific storm
water pollution prevention plan"; however, if storm water discharges in a particular watershed or from
particular facilities or industries are found to cause water-quality problems, watershed-specific or
other individualized permits may be required).
242. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.3.
243. NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d at 1382.
244. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (defining effluent limitations as "[alny restriction imposed by the Di-
rector on quantities, discharge rates, and concentrations of 'pollutants' which are 'discharged' from
'point sources' into 'waters of the United States,' the waters of the 'contiguous zone,' or the ocean").
245. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)-(c) (1994). The Administrator can also set "other
requirements as he deems appropriate." Id. § 1342(a)(2).
246. Id. § 1316(a)(1).
247. See id. § 1316(a)(1).
248. Id.
249. Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Category Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment
Standards, and New Source Performance Standards, 63 Fed. Reg. 50,388, 50,390 (1998) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 136, 439).
250. See 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(2).
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number of industrial categories, many of which are explicitly listed in sec-
tion 306.51 The EPA is directed to revise the list of categories governed
by BADT "from time to time. 252
The EPA, in all likelihood, could include commercial vessels as a
category to be governed by BADT, although it is not entirely clear that
section 306 was intended to apply to mobile sources. 5 3 Section 306 de-
fines a source as "any building, structure, facility, or installation from
which there is or may be the discharge of pollutants." 4 The inclusion of
mobile sources within the terms "building" and "facility" would render a
rather strained reading of section 306, given the plain and ordinary
meaning of those terms.55 On the other hand, a vessel could be consid-
ered an "installation" or a "structure," as both terms seem broad enough
to include any physical or operational system of parts or apparatus. 6
An analogous provision of the Clean Air Act, section 111, expressly
states that its new-source-review program is applicable only to "station-
ary sources, '257 indicating that Congress knew how to limit the applica-
tion of more stringent requirements to new stationary sources when it
wanted to. The Clean Air Act, however, defines the term "stationary
source" in precisely the same manner as the CWA defines the term
"source": "any building, structure, facility, or installation which emits or
may emit any air pollutant. 258  These comparable definitional sections
arguably show that a new source is meant to include only stationary
251. See id. § 1316(b)(1)(A) (including pulp and paper mills, meat product and rendering proc-
essing, grain mills, and other types of industrial facilities).
252. Id. § 1316 (b)(1)(B).
253. See Ore Mining and Dressing; Point Source Category; Effluent Limitations Guidelines, 53
Fed. Reg. 18,764, 18,775 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 440) (stating that the EPA initially be-
lieved that the new source criteria were not designed to address mobile operations); Consolidated
Permit Regulations; NPDES New Dischargers, 45 Fed. Reg. 68,391 (1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 122, 124) (the EPA suspending a portion of the final rule Oct. 15, 1980, and suspending NPDES
"new discharger" requirements for mobile drilling rigs operating in certain offshore areas).
254. 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(3).
255. The broader term, "facility," is generally known as "something... that is built [or] in-
stalled"... "to serve a particular purpose." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 444
(Merriam-Webster Inc. 1991). Facilities are defined by regulation as "buildings, structures, process or
production equipment or machinery which form a permanent part of the new source and which will be
used in its operation." 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(a)(5) (1999). Arguably, "process or production equipment
and machinery" could encompass mobile sources, if they "form a permanent part of the new source."
However, other provisions of the CWA provide separate and distinct definitions for vessels and facili-
ties, indicating that the two terms should not be used interchangeably. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(3),
(10)-(11). Under section 311, which addresses discharges of oil and hazardous substances, vessels lo-
cated in, on, or under waters of the United States or under U.S. jurisdiction are excluded from the
definition of "offshore facility." Id. § 1321(11).
256. A structure is generally defined as "something made up of a number of parts that are held or
put together in a particular way." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1208 (2d ed. 1985). An
installation is defined, in pertinent part, as "[a] system of machinery or other apparatus set up for use."
Id. at 666. However, the EPA has taken a more narrow view of the term installation on at least one
occasion. See 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (defining "installation," for purposes of the Clean Air Act's National
Emission Standards for asbestos, as "any building or structure or any group of buildings or structures
at a single demolition or renovation site that are under the control of the same owner or operator").
257. Clean Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2), (b)(1)(A) (1994).
258. Id. § 7411(a)(3).
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sources for the purposes of both statutes. 9 Yet the express limitation to
stationary air sources makes sense in light of the overall structure of the
Clean Air Act, which includes an entirely separate program for the
regulation of mobile sources.2' To imply such a limitation in the context
of the CWA is less plausible, given that the CWA addresses both sta-
tionary and mobile point sources through the NPDES program. 261
In fact, the EPA has issued BADT standards for two categories of
sources that are at least somewhat mobile: offshore oil and gas extrac-
tion activities262 and placer mines.263 Placer mines, where particles of pre-
259. See Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Ap-
proval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,696 (1980) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 124) [hereinafter Requirements for Preparation]. The EPA stated that "to
treat all of the activities of a ship [as a stationary source] while it is coming to, staying at, and going
from a terminal would violate any common sense notion of 'building,' 'structure,' 'facility,' or 'installa-
tion."' Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, the EPA concluded that marine terminals must include only
ship emissions from "stationary" activities, such as dockside loading and unloading, in determining
whether the terminal itself is a "major" source under the Clean Air Act's Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(5); see also NRDC v.
EPA, 725 F.2d 761, 771-72 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that the EPA must consider the relationship be-
tween vessels and terminals to determine which vessel emissions are stationary in nature so that they
would be attributed to the terminals and included in the State Implementation Plans).
260. Title II of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521-7590, regulates emissions from mobile
sources, while Title I governs emissions from stationary sources. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
7401-7515. This is not to say that overlap between the two programs is completely precluded by the
Clean Air Act; for instance, Title I addresses "indirect sources" like parking garages, which result in
increased air emissions due to the concentration of vehicles. See id. § 7410(a)(5)(C); Sierra Club v.
Larson, 2 F.3d 462, 468 (1st Cir. 1993). Further, mobile sources can be considered stationary sources
under the Clean Air Act when they emit pollutants in the course of activities that are stationary in na-
ture, for example, ships that emit particulate dust during dockside loading operations. See Require-
ments for Preparation, supra note 259, at 52,696; see also Sierra Club, 2 F.3d at 468 (discussing 42
U.S.C. § 7602(z), which generally excludes internal combustion engines used for transportation pur-
poses from the definition of stationary source). Likewise, even though the EPA currently excludes
incidental discharges from vessels from the NPDES program, it does regulate seafood processing
plants as point sources when they are acting in a capacity other than transportation. See Final General
NPDES Permit for Seafood Processors in the State Waters of Alaska and in Receiving Waters Adja-
cent to Alaska and Extending Out 200 Nautical Miles from the Coast and Baseline of Alaska: Alaska
Seafood Processors General NPDES Permit (No. AKG-52-0000), 60 Fed. Reg. 34,991 (1995) (notice
of final general permit July 5, 1995); Association of Pacific Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 806 n.7, 815
(9th Cir. 1980).
261. Courts have consistently held that mobile sources like dump trucks and bulldozers can qual-
ify as "point sources" under the CWA. See United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 726 (3d Cir. 1993);
Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 922 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Alameda County
Assessor's Parcel Nos., 672 F. Supp. 1278, 1284-85 (N.D. Cal. 1987); United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp.
610, 622 (E.D. Va. 1983), affd, 769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 412
(1987); see also Concerned Area Residents for the Env't v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir.
1994) (finding that vehicles used to spread manure are point sources).
262. See Oil and Gas Extraction Point Source Category, Offshore Subcategory; Effluent Limita-
tions Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards, 50 Fed. Reg. 34,591, 34,617-19 (1985) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 435) (proposed Aug. 26, 1985) (proposed regulations for offshore activities,
finding that the term "facilities" includes mobile drilling rigs placed at a drilling site, as well as produc-
tion structures, platforms, and equipment); see also Oil and Gas Extraction Point Source Category;
Offshore Subcategory Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards, 58
Fed. Reg. 12,454 (1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 435) (establishing effluent limitations and per-
formance standards for offshore oil and gas extraction activities). The final rule was upheld in BP Ex-
ploration & Oil, Inc. v. EPA, 66 F.3d 784, 804 (6th Cir. 1995).
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cious metals are extracted from alluvial or glacial deposits, are frequently
moved up and down a stream by the miner in search of "pay dirt. ' 21
Without directly addressing the issue, the Ninth Circuit upheld the
EPA's application of new-source-performance standards to placer
mines, 265 though such activities could be considered more mobile than
stationary in nature. The inclusion of new vessels as "sources" would
probably be upheld as well, as a reasonable interpretation of section
306.266
BADT would surely require improved exchange rates for new ves-
sels, and would most likely require alternative treatment strategies as
well.267  Several promising technologies are currently being explored:
shore side treatment at POTWs; ultraviolet light; micro-filtration; ozona-
tion; environmentally friendly biocides; and temperature (heat).26" The
Canadian vessel Algonorth, with support from the Great Lakes Protec-
tion Fund, the Lake Carrier's Association and the Northeast Midwest In-
stitute, is implementing a demonstration project utilizing a filter that can
trap particles as small as twenty-five microns.269 This would eliminate
aquatic vertebrates, fish eggs, and mussel veliger larvae, along with most
invertebrate eggs, fungi, and algae cysts.' With additional treatment,
such as ultraviolet light or biocides, even smaller bacteria and viruses
could be eradicated.271
263. See Ore Mining and Dressing; Point Source Category; Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pre-
treatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards, 53 Fed. Reg. 18,764 (1988) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pt. 440) (final rule regarding effluent limitations and performance standards for ex-
isting and new gold placer mines). By law, placer mines include "all forms of [mineral] deposit,
excepting veins of quartz or other rock in place." 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1994); see Earl M. Hill, A Brief His-
tory of the Nevada Law of Mining, NEv. LAW., Oct. 1999, at 12, 13 (describing placer deposits).
264. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 18,774.
265. See Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding the EPA's inclu-
sion of placer mines as a regulated category under CWA section 306, as codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1316
(1994)).
266. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (holding that courts must
affirm reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms by an agency charged with imple-
menting the statute).
267. Proposed amendments to NISA appear to require something like BADT. See supra notes
46-47 and accompanying text. Similarly, state legislation in several coastal states would require sterili-
zation of ballast water before ships could enter their waters. See infra notes 291-93 and accompanying
text.
268. See Foster, supra note 16, at 115-16 nn.121-24 (discussing success of various experimental
treatment alternatives, and, in particular, assessing expert opinions regarding shipboard versus on-
shore treatment); Reeves, White Paper, supra note 3, § 3.7 (assessing relative merits and costs of im-
proved ballast exchange, filtering, ultraviolet light, biocides, heat, and on-shore treatment).
269. See Managing Ballast Water to Stop the Introduction of Non-Indigenous Species (visited July
16, 2000) <http://www.lcaships.com/hpbw.htmi> [hereinafter Managing Ballast Water] (on file with the
University of Illinois Law Review).
270. See Allegra Cangelosi et al., The Biological Effectiveness of Filtration as an On-Board Ballast
Treatment Technology (1999) (visited Sept. 15, 2000) <http://www.nemw.org/abstracts.htm> (on file
with the University of Illinois Law Review); Reeves. White Paper, supra note 3, § 3.7.
271. See Reeves, White Paper, supra note 3, § 3.7. The Algonorth project, however, filters only
1,500 gallons per minute; U.S. lakers, carrying as much as 14 million gallons of ballast water when
"light" on cargo, could require filtration up to 18,000 gallons per minute. See Managing Ballast Water,
supra note 269, at 3; Allegra Cangelosi, The Algonorth Experiment, 25 SEAWAY REVIEW 29, 29-33
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Of course, the EPA need not be "fully cognizant of every innova-
tion, wherever employed," but it is arbitrary and capricious to consider
only those technologies that are widely available.272 For example, the
EPA has been required to consider zero discharge as the BADT stan-
dard for the organic chemicals, plastics, and synthetic fibers industries
where several plants, utilizing recycling technologies, had already elimi-
nated their discharges.273 Yet BADT would not necessarily require new
vessels to meet standards as stringent as those achieved utilizing the fil-
ters employed on the Algonorth until filtering technology has been dem-
onstrated as available for the size and type of tanker in question.
Effluent limitations for existing facilities and vessels vary according
to the type of pollutant discharged. Existing sources of conventional
pollutants, such as suspended solids and fecal coliform, must meet the
best conventional technology (BCT) for their industrial class. 74 In com-
parison, existing sources of toxic and nonconventional pollutants are re-
quired to meet effluent limitations based on the more stringent BAT
standard.275
Toxic pollutants are those that, upon exposure, may cause serious,
adverse human-health effects. 76 Nonconventional pollutants comprise a
"catch-all" category of pollutants-those that are not toxic or conven-
tional.277 Congress explicitly listed several nonconventional pollutants,
such as chlorine, ammonia, and color, as well as the thermal component
of discharges,278 and gave the EPA authority to list additional noncon-
ventionas.279
(Jan.-Mar. 1997). A demonstration project utilizing a Voraxial Separator unit capable of processing
4,500 gpm has recently gained the support of the U.S. Maritime Administration and the National Oce-
anic and Atmospheric Administration for implementation onboard the "Cape May" in the Baltimore
area. See Enviro Voraxial Maritime Solutions win support of MARAD, 11 Int'l Env't 9, 2000 WL
7448642 (09/01/00).
272. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 263 (5th Cir. 1989).
273. See id. at 264; Houck, supra note 109, at 452 (noting that the EPA's final standard for organic
chemicals and plastics could hardly be called the best available demonstrated technology, where the
EPA failed to recognize that recycling technologies adopted by a number of plants had already
achieved zero discharge).
274. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(4) (1994). The CWA lists the following conven-
tional pollutants: biochemical oxygen-demanding pollutants (BOD), like nitrogen and phosphorous;
total suspended solids (TSS); fecal coliform; and pH. See id. § 1314(a)(4). The EPA subsequently
designated oil as an additional conventional pollutant on July 30, 1979. See Identification of Conven-
tional Pollutants, 44 Fed. Reg. 44,501, 44,501 (1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 401). Conventionals are
generally oxygen demanding and eutrophying, or contribute to turbidity. See Development of Water
Quality-Based Permit Limitations for Toxic Pollutants; National Policy, 49 Fed. Reg. 9016, 9017
(1984).
275. See33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1), (g)(1).
276. See id. § 1362(13) (defining toxic pollutants as those that, upon exposure, may cause "death,
disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutations, physiological malfunctions (including
malfunctions in reproduction) or physical deformations, in such organism or their offspring"). Toxic
water pollutants are listed pursuant to section 307. See id. § 1317.
277. See id. § 1311(b)(2)(F), (g)(1), (g)(4).
278. Seeid. § 1311(g)(1), (g)(4).
279. See id. § 1311(b)(2)(F).
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Although some components of ballast-water discharges, such as
suspended solids, would be considered conventional pollutants, biologi-
cal materials, including exotic species, would likely fall under the catch-
all category of nonconventional pollutants subject to BAT. If the EPA
were to characterize exotics as nonconventionals, that determination
would be accorded judicial deference as a reasonable interpretation of
the statute.2m
BAT generally requires that existing technology utilized by the
"cleanest" firms in the industry be adopted.28' In setting BAT, the EPA
takes into account engineering technology and operational processes for
categories and subcategories of industry.82 Although BAT is established
with reference to the "best" technology, it does not require the regulated
facility to adopt any one particular technology. Instead, individual dis-
chargers may choose their own abatement technique as long as the efflu-
ent levels specified in their permits are met.283
In addition, as with BADT, the EPA is to consider the costs of
achieving the best technology available, and any non-water-quality im-
pacts as well as energy requirements, in setting BAT.2' The EPA retains
considerable discretion in assigning the weight to be given these fac-
tors.85 Although costs play a role in setting BAT, unlike the BCT limita-
tion for conventional pollutants, 6 the EPA need not perform a cost-
benefit analysis or otherwise justify its choice of BAT on economic
grounds as long as it has determined that the costs can be borne by indus-
try.287 That the technology is in fact available provides evidence that
280. See Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1292 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that the "EPA's decision
to treat settleable solids as a nonconventional pollutant and thus subject to BAT standards was both
reasonable and permissible"). The court noted that "even if settleable solids should more properly be
considered a conventional pollutant,... [the] EPA has determined that settleable solids in placer
mining effluent are a toxic pollutant indicator and thus may be subject to BAT-level limitations." Id.;
see also American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 858 F.2d 262, 263 n.2 (5th Cir. 1988) (upholding EPA's
designation of diesel oil as nonconventional "indicator" pollutant, resulting in imposition of more
stringent BAT regulations over discharge of muds and cuttings contaminated with diesel oil for use in
offshore drilling operations).
281. See Houck, supra note 109, at 451.
282. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(A), 1314(b)(2)(B); Houck, supra note 109, at 445 n.188.
283. See Thompson, supra note 118, at 522.
284. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B).
285. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177,204-07 (5th Cir. 1989).
286. BCT is roughly equivalent to the "best of the average" performers in an industrial category.
BCT limitations are established in light of a variety of factors, including a two-part, "cost-
reasonableness" test. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B); American Paper Inst. v. EPA, 660 F.2d 954, 960-
61 (4th Cir. 1981). The EPA's current methodology for the development of BCT limitations was is-
sued in 1986. See Best Conventional Pollutant Control Technology; Effluent Limitations Guidelines,
51 Fed. Reg. 24,974 (1986) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 405-409,411,412,418,422,424,426,432).
287. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 870 F.2d at 250 n.320 (citing EPA v. National Crushed Stone, 449
U.S. 64 (1980)). Section 304(b)(2)(B) "does not state that costs shall be considered in relation to ef-
fluent reduction." EPA v. National Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. 64, 71 n.10 (1980).
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costs can be borne by the industry. Most facilities have been able to
comply with BAT at a reasonable cost.28
BAT does not require turning a blind eye toward differences among
facilities within industrial categories and among geographical areas. The
EPA has the authority to grant variances or modifications to account for
operational differences and even economic hardship.89 Section 301(g) 21
authorizes a waiver from BAT requirements for nonconventional pollut-
ants if the applicant can demonstrate that its proposed modified effluent
limitation is equal to or more stringent than both the applicable water-
quality standards and the initial standard required under the CWA, i.e.,
the "best practicable control technology currently available" (BPT).29t
The applicant also must show that the modification will not result in ad-
ditional requirements for other sources, and that it will not impair the in-
tegrity of the receiving water or pose unacceptable risks to the environ-
ment or human health.292
In addition, section 301(c) gives the EPA authority to modify BAT
for a facility or vessel upon a showing that modified requirements will:
(1) represent the maximum use of technology within the economic capa-
bility of the owner or operator, and (2) result in reasonable further prog-
ress toward the elimination of pollutant discharge.293 Section 301(n) also
allows variances if the facility demonstrates that it is fundamentally dif-
ferent than other facilities within its industrial category with respect to
the relevant factors used in establishing effluent limitations.294
The imposition of BAT would force existing vessels to achieve bet-
ter exchange rates, and might, in time, require alternative technologies to
minimize the potential for introducing exotics through ballast discharges.
There is reason to believe that existing vessels can do much better than
the eighty-five percent exchange rate referenced in NISA, as would be
necessary if BAT applied. In fact, the Coast Guard has indicated that
ninety percent is an achievable rate of exchange for existing vessels.295
Other estimates range as high as ninety-eight percent as a "reasonably
high" exchange standard.296
288. See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 123, at 744 n.80; Percival, Regulatory Evolution, supra
note 153, at 180.
289. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c), (g), (h).
290. See id. § 13 11(g).
291. Seeid. § 1311.
292. See id. § 1311(g)
293. See id. § 1311(c).
294. See id. § 1311(n). The CWA also allows waivers for dischargers that use "innovative tech-
nology," so long as their control method has potential for industrywide use and advances the CWA's
goal of eliminating the discharge of pollutants. See id. § 1311(k). This section waives compliance with
otherwise applicable standards for up to two years. See id.; see also Derzko, supra note 187, at 30.
295. See Implementation of the National Invasive Species Act of 1996 (NISA), 63 Fed. Reg.
17,782, 17,785-89 (1998) (to be codified at 33 D.F.R. pt. 151) (notice of proposed rulemaking Apr. 10,
1998).
296. See Reeves, Analysis of Laws & Policies, supra note 20, at 66.
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The CWA's effluent limitations also would apply to NOBOBs. The
vessel itself is the regulated point source, regardless of the quantity of
ballast water; therefore, BADT and BAT would be set for NOBOBs just
as they would be for other vessels. BAT might require NOBOB vessels
to "swish and spit" by lightening their cargo by an amount allowing an
influx of enough water to pump out the residues.29  Other suggested
treatment methods for sediment and slop in a NOBOB tank include
chemical biocides and heat.298 Regardless, treatment would be required
prior to discharge into U.S. waters, regardless of whether a vessel en-
tered fully loaded or not.
B. Water-Quality Standards
In addition to technology-based effluent limitations, permit re-
quirements must be ratcheted up if necessary to meet water-quality stan-
dards.299  Water-quality standards are generally adopted by the states,
based on EPA guidelines and subject to EPA approval.3" Section 303(c)
requires that state water-quality standards "protect the public health or
welfare, enhance the quality of water and serve the purposes of this
[Act,] ... taking into consideration their use and value for... propaga-
tion of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, indus-
trial, and other purposes."301
Under section 303(c), a water-quality standard consists of two com-
ponents: designated uses for which the particular water body is to be
protected such as recreation, protection and propagation of fish and
wildlife, or agricultural uses; and water-quality criteria to support those
uses.3 "2 Each state must identify and submit a list of waters for which ex-
isting technology-based pollution controls are not stringent enough to at-
tain or maintain water-quality standards, and the EPA must approve or
disapprove the lists pursuant to section 303(d).3 °3 For waters identified as
water-quality impaired, states are required to establish Total Maximum
Daily Loads (TMDLs) for problem pollutants as necessary to satisfy ap-
plicable water-quality standards with an adequate margin of safety."°
California has listed several water bodies as impaired due to the presence
297. This operation only would require approximately 1.5% reduction in cargo. See id. at 55.
298. See id.
299. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) ("[Tihere shall be achieved.., any more
stringent limitation, including those necessary to meet water quality standards.., established pursuant
to any State law or regulations .....
300. See id. §§ 1314(a), 1313(c).
301. Id. § 1313(c). The ultimate purpose of water-quality standards, like other provisions of the
CWA, is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's wa-
ters." Id. § 1251(a).
302. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 131 (1999). Water-quality criteria may be numeric or narrative. See id.
303. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2).
304. See id. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
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of exotic species.3"5 Theoretically, any permitted discharge into these im-
paired waters would be required to attain zero discharge of exotics to
avoid further degradation and to protect designated uses."
A few coastal states have addressed exotic species by enacting sepa-
rate regulatory programs altogether. Both California and Washington
have adopted fairly aggressive programs for regulating ballast water. 7
After July 1, 2002, the discharge of ballast water into Washington state
waters is authorized only if there has been an open-sea exchange or if the
vessel has treated its ballast water to meet standards set by the Depart-
ment of Fish and Wildlife.' Washington law imposes monitoring and
reporting requirements, with sampling and testing protocols to be deter-
mined by the Department by rule.3" Other coastal states are beginning
to move in this direction. In Michigan, a bill is pending to require vessels
to obtain permits from the Department of Environmental Quality, and to
mandate that ballast water be one hundred percent purified through
sterilization before entering Michigan waters.3t ° New York representa-
tives have introduced a similar measure."'
State programs that pose a danger of defeating federal CWA objec-
tives might be preempted under the Supremacy Clause."2 They also may
305. See Clean Water Act Section 303(d): Availability of List Submissions and Proposed Deci-
sions, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,556.
306. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(A); Foster, supra note 16, at 114-15.
307. See H.B. 2466,56th Leg., 2d Sess (Wash. 2000) (enacted Mar. 24, 2000); CAL. CODE § 71,203,
(effective Jan. 1, 2000). California law requires all ships entering California ports from more than 200
miles offshore to either empty ballast water in the deep sea (2,000 meters depth), retain ballast water
on-board, or treat it, and to manage ballast sediments, unless operators can show that such measures
would produce an unsafe condition for the ship. See id. §§ 71,203-71,204(a). Operators must file re-
ports regarding ballast management. See id. § 71,204(b). The California Water Resources Control
Board is required to evaluate alternative management measures and recommend best available tech-
nologies that reflect the greatest economically feasible degree of reduction in the release of exotic spe-
cies by 2002. See id. § 71,210.
308. See H.B. 2466 § 4(2). The treatment standard shall "ensure that the discharge of treated
ballast water poses minimal risk of introducing nonindigenous species." Id. § 5(5)(a). The department
is directed to consider technological and practical feasibility in developing the standard, and, "where
practical and appropriate, the standards shall be compatible with standards set by the United States
coast guard and shall be developed in consultation with federal and state agencies to ensure consis-
tency with the federal clean water act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387." Id.
309. See id. § 5(5)(b). Washington law provides an exemption for safety, but it is narrower than
that found in NISA. See id. § 4(1) ("When weather or extraordinary circumstances make access to
treatment unsafe to the vessel or crew, the master of a vessel may delay compliance with any treat-
ment required under this subsection until it is safe to complete the treatment.").
310. See S.B. 955,90th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2000) (introduced Feb. 1, 2000); Ron Brochu, Great
Lakes Shipping Industry Protests Proposals to Sterilize Ballast Water, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus.
NEWS, May 4, 2000 (noting that sponsor Sen. Ken Sikkema has softened his stance to allow "best
available technology" rather than mandating sterilization).
311. See A.B. 11,369, 1999 Leg., 223d Sess. (N.Y. 2000) (introduced in Assembly and referred to
Committee on Environmental Conservation June 9, 2000).
312. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; United States v. Locke, 120 S. Ct. 1135, 1152 (2000) (holding
"that Washington's tanker regulations regarding general navigation watch procedures, English language
skills, training, and casualty reporting [were] preempted [by federal law]"); Craig H. Allen, Federalism in
the Era of International Standards: Federal and State Government Regulation of Merchant Vessels in
the United States (Part IV), 31 J. MAR. L. & COM. 15 (2000) (proposing a new approach to maritime
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be prohibited as interfering with international rights of passage.313 State
laws that require changes in vessel design or construction are especially
likely to be invalidated.314
Even if lawful, disparate standards among states with stringent
standards, like California, and more lenient states would result in a
patchwork quilt of regulation. To ensure compliance, vessels could be
required to meet the most stringent restrictions of all states they pass
through. Ship owners and operators will resist individual state efforts as
confusing and inefficient. Effective and even-handed implementation of
the CWA's programs for NPDES permits and water-quality standards
for the control of ballast discharges will depend on cooperative efforts
between the EPA and the states and between the EPA and the Coast
Guard.
VI. INTERAGENCY AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION
The CWA encourages and even requires coordination between the
EPA and the states, and between the EPA and other federal entities, in-
cluding the military and the Coast Guard, in the regulation of water pol-
lution. As for other federal agencies, the EPA must, for example, in-
clude a condition within permits issued to facilities that operate as
transportation vessels specifying that their discharges comply with any
applicable Coast Guard regulations for safe transportation, handling, and
storage of pollutants.315
More to the point, CWA section 312 specifies roles for both the
EPA and the Coast Guard, and clarifies the role of the states, in regu-
lating discharges of sewage through marine sanitation devices (MSDs)
and incidental discharges from vessels of the armed forces through ma-
rine pollution-control devices (MPCDs). 16 It requires the EPA to estab-
lish general prohibitions and performance standards and provides the
Coast Guard with enforcement authority, allowing it to board and in-
spect vessels on U.S. waters and to execute warrants issued by officers or
courts of competent jurisdiction.3 7 Section 312 also allows a limited role
for states to protect water quality, while minimizing the potential for
preemption analysis, as a culmination of four articles on the regulation of vessel safety and pollution
prevention).
313. See Dubner, supra note 5, at 149-53 (discussing international conventions governing passage
of foreign vessels). Coastal states may take steps to regulate pollution in territorial seas, but such steps
must be reasonable and nondiscriminatory, and may not interfere with rights of passage. See UN-
CLOS, supra note 104, arts. 19, 21, & 24.
314. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 163-68 (1978) (holding that Congress occu-
pied the field and therefore preempted state laws on tanker design and construction); UNCLOS, supra
note 104, art. 211 § 6(c) (state laws and regulations "may relate to discharges and navigational prac-
tices but shall not require foreign vessels to observe design construction, manning or equipment stan-
dards other than generally accepted international rules and standards.").
315. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(p) (1999).
316. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1322 (1994).
317. See id. § 1322(k)(1). CWA section 312 may also be enforced by a state. See id.
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state requirements to conflict with federal objectives. As such, section
312 could provide a cooperative model for the EPA to follow in regulat-
ing ballast-water discharges. Because MSD and MPCD requirements are
not implemented through the NPDES permit program, section 312 is not
a complete analogy for regulating ballast-water discharges from commer-
cial vessels. Instead, absent legislative amendment, this section should
be considered merely as guidance for building working relationships
among interested agencies and states.
With respect to MSDs, the EPA, in consultation with the Coast
Guard, must establish standards of performance to prevent the discharge
of inadequately treated sewage from vessels,318 and must also establish a
testing and certification regime to regulate the sale of MSDs.319 The
standards, which are phased in over time for existing vessels,3 "° must be
consistent with maritime safety and other marine and navigation laws,
and coordinated with Coast Guard standards.321 Commercial vessels op-
erating in the Great Lakes must install MSDs that at least meet secon-
dary treatment quality.
322
MPCD performance standards for military vessels are to be issued
by the EPA and the Department of Defense, in consultation with the
Coast Guard and the Secretaries of State and Commerce.323 The stan
dards should mitigate adverse impacts on the marine environment, con-
sidering the nature and environmental effects of the discharge, the prac-
ticability and costs of the installation and use of the MPCD, its effects on
the vessel's operational capability, and applicable U.S. and international
law.324 Standards may reflect distinctions between classes, types, and
sizes of vessels, and may even be waived "as necessary or appropriate"
for classes, types, or sizes of vessels, as well as for individual vessels.32
Currently, performance standards for military vessels are being is-
sued pursuant to a joint effort by the EPA, Department of Defense
(DOD), Department of State, Department of Commerce, and the Coast
Guard.326 The EPA and DOD have determined that it is reasonable and
318. See id. § 1322(b). The EPA had previously been reluctant to regulate sewage discharges
from vessels due to the lack of availability of pump-out facilities. See S. REP. No. 95-370, at 66 (1977),
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4391.
319. See 33 U.S.C. § 1322(g)-(h).
320. See id. § 1322(c)(1)(A).
321. See id. § 1322(b)(1).
322. See id. § 1322(c)(1)(B).
323. See 33 U.S.C. § 1322(n)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1998); see also supra Part III.B. (discussing legisla-
tive history of section 312(n)).
324. 33 U.S.C. § 1322(n)(2)-(3). CWA section 312(n) applies unless the Secretary of Defense
finds that compliance "would not be in the national security interests of the United States." Id §
1322(n)(1).
325. Id. § 1322(c)(2).
326. See Uniform National Discharge Standards for Vessels of the Armed Forces, 64 Fed. Reg.
25,126, 25,130 (1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 9 and 40 C.F.R. ch. VII); Uniform National Dis-
charge Standards for Vessels of the Armed Forces, 63 Fed. Reg. 45,298, 45,306 (1999) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1700 and ch. VII) (proposed Aug. 25, 1998).
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practicable to regulate discharges of ballast water through MPCDs,2 7 and
that current management practices for open-ocean exchange, based on
international guidelines, "demonstrate the availability of controls to
mitigate the potential adverse environmental impacts from this dis-
charge."
328
Congress expressly preempted most state laws and regulations re-
garding the design, manufacture, installation, or use of both MSDs and
MPCDs. 319 Upon petition to the EPA, however, states may prohibit dis-
charges in some or all of the waters within the state as required for the
protection and enhancement of water quality, if the EPA determines, in-
ter alia, that adequate facilities for the safe and sanitary removal and
treatment of sewage or ballast water from vessels are reasonably avail-
able.33
Looking to section 312, the EPA, with Coast Guard cooperation
and input, could issue national effluent limitations for ballast-water dis-
charges from commercial vessels, reflecting BAT for MPCDs or alterna-
tive treatment or exchange methods. The EPA, again with the Coast
Guard as a consulting partner, could then issue general, regional, or indi-
vidual permits incorporating the effluent limitations.331 With a unified
body of standards in place, vessel owners and operators get the benefits
of certainty, and ships could be modified or designed to meet the stan-
dards, phased in to require state-of-the-art technologies within a reason-
able period of time.332
327. See Uniform National Discharge Standards for Vessels of the Armed Forces, 63 Fed. Reg. at
45,309 (defining MPCD, as used in the proposed rule, as "a control technology or a management prac-
tice that can reasonably and practicably be installed or otherwise used on a vessel of the Armed Forces
to receive, retain, treat, control or discharge a discharge incidental to the normal operation of the ves-
sel").
328. Id. at 45,311. The Navy and the Coast Guard either currently implement or are in the proc-
ess of approving a ballast-water management policy requiring an open-ocean, ballast-water exchange,
based on the IMO Guidelines for Preventing the Introduction of Unwanted Aquatic Organisms and
Pathogens from Ships' Ballast Water and Sediment Discharge. See id. at 45,306. In the final rule, the
agencies noted that a more detailed assessment of the MPCD control options and performance stan-
dards for each class of vessels would be performed in a subsequent phase of rulemaking. See Uniform
National Discharge Standards for Vessels of the Armed Forces, 64 Fed. Reg. at 25,130.
329. See 33 U.S.C. § 1322(f)(1) (1994). States are allowed to impose more stringent requirements
for MSDs on houseboats. Id. § 1322(f)(1)(B).
330. See id. § 1322(f)(3)-(4), (n)(7)(B).
331. See, e.g., Final General NPDES Permit for Seafood Processors in the State Waters of Alaska
and in Receiving Waters Adjacent to Alaska and Extending Out 200 Nautical Miles from the Coast
and Baseline of Alaska: Alaskan Seafood Processors General NPDES Permit (No. AKG-52-0000), 60
Fed.. Reg. 34,991 (1995) (notice of final general NPDES permit July 5, 1995) (authorizing certain dis-
charges from offshore, nearshore and shore-based vessels and onshore facilities engaged in seafood
processing; permitting discharges including processing wastes, process disinfectants, sanitary wastewa-
ter, boiler water, gray water, water used to transfer seafood to a facility, and live tank water "to waters
of the United States in and contiguous to the State of Alaska, except for receiving waters excluded
from coverage as protected, special, at-risk, degraded or adjacent to a designated 'seafood processing
center"'; prohibiting discharges of petroleum hydrocarbons, toxic pollutants, or other pollutants not
specified in the permit).
332. See O'Toole, supra note 84, at 48. O'Toole concludes that "[t]he best way to ensure Navy
ship compliance is to develop a coherent body of effluent standards for application to all Navy ships in
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Meanwhile, states would retain a role in enforcing the limitations
contained within the permits.333 However, to avoid inconsistencies from
port to port, the MSD and MPCD approach should be followed such that
states could not impose more stringent requirements or establish "no dis-
charge" zones absent appropriate determinations and approval by the
EPA. Although states with delegated NPDES authority may be reluc-
tant to relinquish some of that authority back to the federal agencies, in
the context of ballast-water discharges, it would seem that states have
more to gain than to lose under a program of uniform national effluent
limitations.334
The EPA's ability to withdraw or otherwise limit only that part of a
state NPDES program dealing with vessels may be inhibited by existing
statutory provisions. The gist of section 402 is that states with "adequate
authority" to carry out the permit program assume control over the en-
tire program.335 To that end, state permit programs generally must be
approved or disapproved in their entirety.336 The CWA does, however,
allow for partial delegation, so long as the state's permit program covers
major categories of point sources and is, in and of itself, a complete per-
mit program covering a "significant and identifiable part of the State
program."337
all waters of the U.S. and on the high seas." Id. at 46. Instead of EPA enforcement, however, he rec-
onmends that the standards be implemented through the existing command and control structure of
the Navy. See id.
333. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
334. See O'Toole, supra note 84, at 48-49.
335. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)-(c). To establish "adequate" permit authority, states must insure,
among other things, that their permits will (1) comply with CWA provisions governing effluent limita-
tions, new sources, toxic pollutants, MSDs, and ocean-discharge criteria; (2) be limited to fixed terms
not exceeding five years; (3) be terminated or modified for cause; (4) require reporting and inspection;
and (5) be enforceable through civil and criminal penalties. See id § 1342(b)(1)-(9). States must also
insure that the EPA will receive notice of permit applications, see id. § 1342(b)(4), and that no permit
will issue if the Army Corps of Engineers, after consulting with the Coast Guard, determines that "an-
chorage and navigation" of navigable waters would be "substantially impaired." Id. § 1342(b)(6).
336. See id. § 1342(c), (n); S. REP. No. 92-414, at 71 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3737; 2 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1489 (Comm. Print compiled for the Senate Comm. on Pub. Works 1973).
Congress explained that "after a State submits a program which meets the criteria established by the
Administrator pursuant to regulations, the Administrator shall suspend his activity in such State under
the Federal permit program." Id. It went on to state that it was not, however, persuaded "that by lim-
iting the EPA's authority to withdraw approval of a state program to withdrawing approval as to the
entire program, Congress emphasized that only one government shall operate an NPDES permit pro-
gram within a State.... Even in delegated states, EPA retains 'substantial review authority."' Id.; see
EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 226-27 (1976) (citing leg-
islative history); Shell Oil v. Train, 585 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that the EPA has residual
supervisory responsibility under section 402's veto and withdrawal provisions, but stating that once a
program is approved, the federal program is suspended, creating "a separate and independent State
authority to administer the NPDES pollution controls") (citation omitted); see also Mianus River
Preservation Comm. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 899, 905 (2d Cir. 1976).
337. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(n)(3)-(4). These provisions were designed to allow states to gradually as-
sume a regulatory role, rather than taking authority for the entire program all at once. See Oliver A.
Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of Delegation of
CWA § 404 and Related Programs to the States, 54 MD. L. REV. 1242, 1292-93 (1995).
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Once a state program is approved, the EPA can withdraw its ap-
proval if the state fails to administer it in accordance with federal re-
quirements.338 Again, Congress intended that state programs not be
piecemealed.339 In fact, Congress rejected an EPA proposal that section
402 be revised to allow withdrawal for categories or classes of sources,
reflecting its concern that states be given maximum responsibility for the
NPDES program and that the EPA's review authority be restricted as
much as was consistent with its overall responsibility for assuring that the
CWA's national goals are met in a timely fashion.340
In any event, EPA withdrawal is a drastic measure, and there are
significant obstacles to taking back authority: "The procedures for with-
drawal of state programs would be suitable for the Nuremburg trials, and
will be invoked only upon epochal occasions.""4  Because of its disrup-
tive nature and the resulting ill-will, the EPA and state governments
generally strive to avoid withdrawal. 42
Instead of withdrawing state NPDES programs that attempt to im-
pose more stringent or contradictory requirements on ballast-water dis-
charges, the EPA could take either of two less-drastic steps. Assuming
that, once the EPA rescinds its exclusion for ballast-water discharges,
states will have to seek approval of new provisions governing vessels, the
EPA could simply refuse to approve that portion of the state program.
Disapproval would be justified on the grounds that inconsistent state
programs fail to comply with CWA provisions governing effluent limita-
tions. 3
Alternatively, if a state had an approved program, the EPA could
veto individual ballast-water discharge permits issued by the state on the
grounds that any nonuniform requirements are "outside the guidelines
and requirements" of the CWA.' In practice, the EPA's veto power is
wielded with a light touch: "oversight is an essentially state-friendly pro-
338. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3)-(4), (n).
339. See id. § 1342(c)(3), (d). These provisions have been described as giving "all-or-nothing
authority to withdraw approval of a state NPDES program." EPA v. California ex rel. State Water
Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 226 n.39.
340. See 1 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 814, 854-55 (Comm. Print compiled for the Senate Comm.
on Pub. Works 1973); H.R. REP. No. 92-911 (1972). The first petition for the withdrawal of all dele-
gated programs- air, water, and waste - was recently submitted by environmental groups in Ohio, in
what the EPA calls an "unprecedented" move. See John C. Kuehner, U.S. EPA to Review Ohio
EPA's Operations, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 2, 2000, at Bi. The Ohio EPA is charged with mis-
handling public complaints, making technical errors in issuing permits, and underenforcing permit
violations. See id. Bertram Frey, Deputy Regional Counsel for Region 5, which includes Ohio, re-
ported that withdrawal was unlikely; instead, "[i]f corrections are needed, and the Ohio EPA agrees to
them, 'that's the end of it."' Id.
341. WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 367-68 (footnote omitted) (2d ed. 1994).
342. See D. Brennen Keene, Comment, The Inconsistency of Virginia's Execution of the NPDES
Permit Program: The Foreclosure of Citizen Attorneys General from State and Federal Courts, 29 U.
RICH. L. REV. 715, 748-49 (1995).
343. See33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1) (1994).
344. Id. § 1342(d)(2); see 40 C.F.R. § 123.44(c) (1999).
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cess involving a great deal more jawboning and negotiation than ada-
mant intrusion. ',345 However, individual permit supervision is far less of-
fensive to state sovereignty than is withdrawal of the entire NPDES pro-
gram, and the EPA should not be afraid to invoke its veto power in
appropriate circumstances.346 Although Congress intended states to play
a significant role in the NPDES program, Congress also wanted the EPA
to assure uniformity and consistency by engaging in a vigorous review of
state programs.347
VII. CONCLUSION
The CWA's NPDES program is clearly applicable to ballast-water
discharges from vessels. Neither the difficulty of regulating mobile ves-
sels, nor the possibility that costs may at times exceed economic benefits,
justifies a refusal to regulate. The incorporation of technology-based
controls through the NPDES permit system would result in rapid emis-
sion reduction, and could ultimately eliminate contaminated ballast-
water discharges altogether.
Once the EPA rescinds its regulatory exclusion for ballast-water
discharges, there are several approaches available to the EPA to mini-
mize the administrative difficulties of regulating vessels and to ensure
adequate control of their discharges through BAT and BADT. The
regulatory outcome will be more readily acceptable to the shipping in-
dustry and to other interested governmental players if the EPA issues
new regulations and general or individual permits with the cooperation
and input of the Coast Guard and affected coastal states. When the ap-
propriate permits are in place, monitoring will be less costly and more
consistent, and enforcement more easily accomplished.
The imposition of BAT and BADT also could motivate vessel own-
ers and operators to achieve a higher level of efficacy than under current
requirements and guidelines. By imposing uniform national effluent
limitations, the CWA levels the playing field and minimizes "forum
shopping," and can even serve to stimulate innovation. Meanwhile, the
states may still be able to play a meaningful role in controlling the dis-
charge of ballast pollutants within their jurisdiction through delegated
permit authority and water-quality standards.
Economic approaches, on the other hand, whether in the form of
taxes, subsidies, or effluent-trading programs, are not explicitly author-
ized by the CWA. Even if implicitly allowed by law, none of these tools
provides an adequate replacement for the uniform requirements man-
345. Houck & Rolland, supra note 337, at 1293.
346. See RODGERS, supra note 341, at 385 ("Individual permit supervision is a form of counsel
quieter than a strident takeback of approved state authority (abhorrent for a variety of reasons) and
should be invoked more often.").
347. See S. REP. No. 95-370, at 73 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4398; Houck &
Rolland, supra note 337, at 1293.
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dated by the CWA's NPDES program for point source discharges.
Moreover, the multiple opportunities for public involvement and judicial
review provided by the CWA, and the ease of enforcement of the
NPDES program, weigh heavily in favor of the regulatory regime.
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